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THE QUEEN v. PRICE.
To burn a dead body, instead of burying it, is not a misdemeanor, nuless it is so
done as to amount to a public nuisance.
If an inquest ought to be held upon a dead body, it is a misdemeanor so to dispose of the body as to prevent the coroner from holding the inquest.
AT the assizes held at Cardiff before STEPHEN, J., in February
1884, William Price was indicted for trying to burn the body of
his child, instead of burying it, and a second indictment charged
him with attempting to burn the body with intent to prevent the
holding of an inquest upon it.

C. B. Hughes, Q. C., and B. T. Williams, appeared for the
prosecution.
The prisoner was undefended.
After hearing counsel for the prosecution the learned judge left
the case to the jury, directing them in the terms of his charge to
the grand jury, which on account of the importance and novelty
of the subject to which it relates, is here given. The jury acquitted
the prisoner on both charges.
J.-One of the cases brought before you is so singular in its character, and involves a legal question of so much novelty and of such general interest, that I propose to state at some
length what I believe to be the law upon the matter. I have given
it all the consideration I could, and I am permitted to say that although I alone am responsible for what I am about to say to you,
Lord Justice FRY takes the same view of the subject as I do, and
for the same reasons.
William Price is charged with a misdemeanor under the following
circumstances : He had in his house a child five months old of which
he is said to have been the father. The child died and Price, as
it seems, did not register its death. The coroner accordingly gave
him notice on Saturday, the 12th of January 1884, that unless he
sent a medical certificate of the cause of the child's death he (the
coroner) would hold an inquest on the body on the following Monday. Price on the Monday afternoon took the body of the child
to a field of his own, some distance from the town of Llantrissant,.
STEPHEN,
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put it into a ten gallon cask of petroleum and set the Petroleum on
fire. A crowd collected; the body of the child which was burning
was covered with earth, and the flames were extinguished, and Price
was brought before the magistrates and committed for trial. He
will be indicted before you on a charge which in different forms
imputes to him as criminal two parts of what he is said" to have
done. Namely, first, his having prevented the holding of an
inquest on the body ; and secondly, his having attempted to burn
the child's body.
With respect to the prevention of the inquest, the law is that it
is a misdemeanor to prevent the holding of an inquest which ought
to be held by disposing of the body. It is essential to this offence
that the inquest which it is proposed to hold is one which ought
to be held. The coroner has not an absolute right to hold inquests
in every case in which he chooses to do so. It would be intolerable
if he had power to intrude, without adequate cause upon the privacy of a family in distress and to interfere with their arrangemenis
for a funeral. Nothing can justify such interference except a reasonable suspicion that there may have been something peculiar in
the death, that it may have been due to other causes than common
illness. In such cases the coroner not only may, but ought to hold
an inquest, and to prevent him from doing so by disposing of the
body in any way-for an inquest must be held on the view of the
body-is a misdemeanor. The depositions in the present case do
not very clearly show why the coroner considered an inquest necessary. If you think that the conduct of Price was such as to give
the coroner fair grounds for holding one, you ought to find a true
bill, for beyond all question Price did as much as in him lay to dispose of the body in such a manner as to make an inquest impossible.
The other fact charged as criminal is the attempt made by Price
to burn the child's body, and this raises, in a form which makes it
my duty to direct you upon it, a question which has been several
times discussed, and has attracted some public attention, though so
far as I know no legal decision upon it has ever been given, the
question, namely, whether it is misdemeanor at common law to
burn a dead body instead of'burying it.
As there is no direct authority upon this question I have found
it necessary to examine several branches of the law which bear
upon it more or less remotely. The practice of burning dead bodies
VOL. XXXII.-71
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prevailed td a considerable extent under the Romans, as it does to
this day amongst the Hindoos, though it is said that the practice of burial is both older and more general. Burning appears
to have been discontinued in this country and in other parts of
Europe when Christianity was fully established, as the destruction
of the body by fire was considered, for reasons to which I need not
r.efer here, to be opposed to Christian sentiment, but this change
took place so long ago, and the substitution of burial for burning
was so complete, that the butning of the dead has never been formally forbidden, or even mentioned or referred to, so far as I know,
in any part of our law. The subject of burial was formally, and
for many centuries exclusively, a branch of the ecclesiastical or
canon law. Amongst the English writers on this subject, little is
to be found relating to burial. The subject was much more elaborately and systematically studied in Roman Catholic countries
than in England, because the law itself prevailed much more extensively. In the Jus Ecelesiasticum of Van Espen II. 142-168,
Part II., sect. iv., tit. vii., there is an elaborate discourse filling
twenty-two folio pages in double columns on-the subject of burial,
in which every branch of the subject is systematically arranged and
discussed, with reference to numerous authorities. The importance
of it is that it shows the view taken by the canonists, and this
view had great influence on our own ecclesiastical lawyers, though
only a very small part of the canon law itself was ever introduced
into this country.
Van Espen throughout regards the participation in funeral rites
as a privilege to which, subject to certain conditions, all the members of the church were entitled, and the deprivation of which was
a kind of posthumous punishment analogous to the excommunication of the living. The great question with which he occupies himself is, in what cases ought burial to be denied? The general
principle is, that those who are not worthy of church privileges in
life are also to be excluded from them after death. (" Sicuti enim
nonnullos vivos a sua communione prcesertim in sacrisjam yridem
excludendos censuit, ita quoque eosdem sue communione post mortem indignos credidit.") As for the manner in which the dead
bodies of persons deprived of Christian burial were to be disposed
of, Van Espen says only that though in some instances the civil
power may have entirely forbidden burial, whereby bodies may
remain unburied and exposed to the sight of all to be devoured by
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beasts or destroyed by the weather (he considers the dissection of
criminals as a case of this sort), the church has never made such
a provision, and has never prohibited the covering of such corpses
with the earth.
This way of looking at the subject seems to explain how the law
came to be silent on exceptional ways of disposing of dead bodies.
The question was, In what cases burial must be refused ? As for
the way of disposing of bodies to which it was refused, the matter
escaped attention, being probably regarded as a matter which
interested those only who were so unfortunate as to have charge
of such bodies.
The famous judgment of Lord STOWELL in the case of iron coffins (Gilbert v. Buzzard, 2 Hag. Con. Rep. 333), which constitutes
an elaborate treatise on burial, proceeds upon the same principles.
The law presumes that every one will wish that the bodies of
those in whom he was interested in their lifetimes should have Christian burial. The possibility of a man's entertaining and acting
upon a different view is not considered.
These considerations explain the reason why the law is silent as
to the practice of burning the dead. Before I come to consider its
legality directlyit will be well to notice some analogous topics which
throw light upon it. There is one practice which has an analogy
to funeral burning, inasmuch as it constitutes an exceptional
method of dealing with dead bodies. I refer to anatomy. Anatomy was practised in England at least as far back as the very
beginning of the seventeenth century. It continued to be practiced
without, so far as I know, any interference on the part of the legislature down to the year 1832, in which was passed the act for
regulating schools of anatomy: 2 & 3 Win. 4, c. 75. This act
recites the importance of anatomy, and that "the legal supply of
human bodies for such anatomical examination is insufficient fully
to provide the means of such knowledge." It then makes provision for the supply of such bodies by enabling "any executor or
other party having lawful possession of the body of any deceased
person," to permit the body to be dissected, except in certain cases.
The effect of this has been that the bodies of persons dying in
various public institutions whose relations are unknown, are so dissected. The act establishes other regulations not material to the
present question, and enacts that after examination the bodies shall
be "decently interred." This act appears to me to prove clearly
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that Parliament regarded anatomy as a legal practice, and further,
that it coniidered that there was such a thing as "a legal supply
of human bodies," though that supply was insufficient for the purpose. This is inconsistent with the opinion that it is an absolute
duty on the part of persons in charge of dead bodies to bury them,
and this conclusion is rather strengthened than otherwise by the
provision in s. 13, that the "party removing" the body shall provide for its decent burial after examination. This seems to imply
that apart from the act the obligation to bury would not exist, and
it is remarkable that the words arb not, as in the earlier section,
"executor or otherparty," but "party removing," referring no doubt
to the master of the workhouse or other person in a similar position who hands the body over to the surgeons. Upon him the
statute imposes the duty of decently interring the bodies with which
he is allowed to deal. The executor's rights at common law, whatever they may be, are not altered.
I come now to a series of cases more closely connected with the
present case. As is well known the great demand for bodies for
anatomical purposes not only led in some cases to murders, the
object of which was to sell the body of the murdered person, but
also to robberies of churchyards by what were commonly called
resurrection men. This practice prevailed for a considerable length
of time, as appears from the case of Bex v. l/nn, 2 T. R. 738,
decided in 1788-forty-four years before the Anatomy Act. In that
case it was held to be a misdemeanor to disinter a body for the
purpose of dissection, the court saying that common decency required that the practice should be put a stop to, that the offence
was cognisable in a criminal court as being "highly indecent and
contra bonos mores, at the bare idea alone of which nature revolted."
They also said that "it had been the regular practice of the Old
Bailey in modern times to try charges of this nature." It is to
be observed in reference to this case, that the act done would have
been a peculiarly indecent theft if it had not been for the technical
reason that a dead body is not the subject of property. The case,
however, has been carried a step farther in modern times. It was
held in Beg. v. Sharpe, 1 D. & B. 160, to be a misdemeanor to
disinter a body at all without lawful authority, even when the
motives of the offender were pious and laudable, the case being one
in which a son disinterred his mother in order to bury her in his
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father's grave, but he got access to the grave and permission to
open it by a false pretence.
The law to be collected from these authorities seems to me to be
this: The practice of anatomy is lawful and useful though it may
involve an unusual means of disposing of dead bodies and though.
it certainly shocks the feelings of many persons, but to open a grave
and disinter a dead body without authority is a misdemeanor, even
if it is done for a laudable purpose.
These cases, for the reasons I have given, have some analogy to
the case of burying a dead body, but they are remote from it.
They certainly do not warrant the proposition that to burn a dead
body is in itself a misdemeanor.
Two other cases come rather nearer to the point. They are Beg
v. Vann, 2 Den. 325, and Beg. v. Stewart, 12 A. & E. 773,
779.
Each of these cases lays down in unqualified terms
that it is the duty of certain specified persons to bury in
particular cases. The case of Beg. v. Stewart, supra, lays down
the following principles: "Every person dying in this country, and not within certain exclusions laid down by the ecclesiastical law, has a right to Christian burial, and that implies the
right to be carried from the place where his body lies to the parish
cemetery." It adds, "the individual under whose roof a poor
person dies is bound," (i.e., if no one else is so bound, as qppears
from the rest of the case) " to carry the body decently covered to
the place of burial. He cannot keep him unburied nor do anything which prevents Christian burial. He cannot, therefore, cast
him out so as to expose the body to violation, or to offend the feelings or endanger the health of the living ; for the same reason he
cannot carry him uncovered to the grave." In the case of Beg. v.
Vann, the court held: " That a man is bound to give Christian
burial to his deceased child, if he has the means of doing so; but
he is not liable to be indicted for a nuisance if he has not the
means of providing burial for it."
These cases are the nearest approach which I have been able to
find to an authority directly upon the present point. It may be
said that if .there is an absolute duty upon a man having the means
to bury his child, and if it is a duty to give every corpse Christian
burial, the duty must be violated by burning it. I do not think,
however, that the cases really mean to lay down any such rule.
The question of burning was not before the court in either case.
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In Beg. v. Stewart the question was whether the duty of burial lay
upon the parish officers or upon some oth~er person. In Beg. v.
Vann the question was whether a man who had not the means to
bury his child was bound to incur a debt in order to do so. In
neither case can the court have intended to express themselves with
complete verbal accuracy, for in the case of Beg. v. Stewart the
court speaks of the "rights" of a dead body, which is obviously a
popular form of expression-a corpse not being capable of rights,
and in both cases the expression "Christian burial " is used, which
is obviously inapplicable to persons who are not Christians, Jews
for instance, Mahommedans or Hindoos. To this I may add that
the attention of neither court was called to the subject of anatomy
already referred to. Skeletons and anatomical preparations could
not be innocently obtained if the language of the cases referred to
were construed as if it were intended to be severely and literally
accurate.
There is only one other case to be mentioned. It is the case of
Williams v. Williams, which was decided just two years ago by
KAY, J., in the Chancery Division of the High Court, and is
reported in the Law Reports, 20 Ch. D. -659, (21 Am. Law
Reg. (N.S.) 508). In this case one H. Crookenden directed his
friend, Eliza Williams, to burn his body, and directed his executors to pay her expenses. The executors buried the body. Miss
Williams got leave from the Secretary of State to disinter it
in order, as she said, to be buried elsewhere. Having obtained
possession of it by this misrepresentation, she burnt it, and sued
the executors for her expenses. The case leaves the question now
before me undecided. "The purpose," said Judge KAY, "confessedly was to have the body burnt, and thereupon arises a very
considerable question whether that is or is not a lawful purpose
according to the law of this country. That is a question I am not
going to decide." He held that in that particular case the removing of the body and its burning were both illegal according to the
decision of Beg. v. Sharpe, I D. & B. 160, already referred to.
" Giving the lady credit" he said, "for the best of motives, there
can be no kind of doubt that the act of removing the body by that
license and then burning it was as distinct a fraud on that license
as anything could possibly be." This was enough for the purposes
of the particular case, and the learned judge accordingly expressed
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no opinion on the question on which it now becomes my duty to
direct you.
The question arises in the present case in a perfectly clear and
simple form, unembarrassed by any such consideration as applied
to the other cases to which I have referred. There is no question
here of the illegality and dishonesty which marked the conduct of
those that were described as resurrection men, nor of the artifices,
not indeed criminal, but certainly disingenuous, by which possession
of the body was obtained in the cases of Reg. v. Sitarp)e and WilZiams v. TIilliams. Price had lawful possession of the child's body,
and it was not only his right but his duty to dispose of it by burying, or in any other manner not in itself illegal. Hence I must
consider the question whether to burn a dead body instead of burying it is in itself an illegal act.
After full consideration, I am of opinion that a person who burns
instead of burying a dead body does not commit a criminal act,
unless he does it in such a manner as to amount to a public nuisance at common law. My reason for this opinion is that upon the
fullest examination of the authorities, I have, as the preceding review of them shows, been unable to discover any authority for the
proposition that it is a misdemeanor to burn a dead body, and in
the absence of such authority I feel that I have no right to declare
it to be one.
There are some instances no doubt in which courts of justice have
declared acts to be misdemeanors, which had never previously been
decided to be so, but I think it will be found that in every such
case the act involved great public mischief or moral scandal. It
is not my place to offer any opinion on the comparative merits of
burning and burying corpses, but before I could hold that it must
be a misdemeanor to burn a dead body I must be satisfied not
only that some people, or even that many people object to the practice, but that it is on plain undeniable grounds, highly mischievous
or grossly scandalous. Even then I should pause long before I held
it to be a misdemeanor, for many acts involving the grossest indeceny and grave public mischief-incest for instance, and, where
there is no conspiracy, seduction or adultery-are not misdemeanors,
but I cannot take even the first step. Sir Thomas Browne finishes
his famous essay on Urn Burial with a quotation from Lucan, which
in eight words seems to sum up the matter: "Tabesne cadavera sol-
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vat an roqus haud refert." Whether decay or fire consumes corpses
matters not. .The difference between the two processes is only that
one is quick, the other slow. Each is so horrible that every healthy
imagination would turn away from its details ; but one or the other
is inevitable, and each may be concealed from observation by proper precautions. There are, no doubt, religious convictions and
feelings connected with the subject which every one would wish to
treat with respect and tenderness, and I suppose there is no doubt
that as a matter of historical fact the disuse of burning bodies was
due to the force of those sentiments. I do not think however that
it can be said that every practice which startles and jars upon the
religious sentiments of the majority of the population is for that
reason a misdemeanor at common law. The statement of such a
proposition, in plain words, is a sufficient refutation of it, but nothing short of this will support the conclusion that td burn a dead
body must be a misdemeanor. As to the public interest in the
matter, burning, on the one hand, effectually prevents the bodies
of the dead from poisoning .the living. On the other hand, it
might, no doubt, destroy the evidence of crime. These however
are matters for the legislature and not for me. It may be that it
would be well for Parliament to regulate or forbid the burning of
bodies, but the great leading rule of criminal law is that nothing
is a crime unless it is plainly forbidden by law. This rule is no
doubt subject to exceptions, but they are rare, narrow, and to be
admitted with the greatest reluctance, and only upon the strongest
reasons.
This brings me to the last observation I have to make. Though
I think that to burn a dead body decently and inoffensively is not
criminal, it is obvious that if it is done in such a manner as to be
offensive to others it is a nuisance of an aggravated kind. A common nuisance is an act which obstructs or causes inconvenience or
damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all her
Majesty's subjects. To burn a dead body in such a place and such
a manner as to annoy persons passing along public roads or other
places where they have a right to go, is beyond all doubt a nuisance,
as nothing more offensive, both to sight and to smell can be imagined. The depositions in this case do not state very distinctly the
nature and situation of the place where this act was done, but if
you think upon inquiry that there is evidence of its having been
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done in such a situation and manner as to be offensive to any considerable number of persons you should find a true bill.
The question involved in this case has
never before, so far as we can learn, been
before an English or American court of
justice for decision ; and the importance
of the subject as well as the interest
and attention it is attracting, both in
the medical profession and from the general public, is sufficient warrant for its
presentation in this place. The case of
1171liamsv. Williams, decided two years
ago in the Chancery Division of the High
Court of Justice, reported and annotated
in 21 Am. Law JReg., N. S., 508, was a
case which arose out of the cremation of
the body of a testator, but the question
here involved was not decided. The
great learning of the judge who gave
the charge in the principal case, as well
as the fact that Lord Justice Fu concurred in this opinion, will invest it with
great authority whenever the question
shall again come up for decision, as it
unquestionably will in the not far distant
future. We have read the case carefully
several times; and, while we confess that
our personal opinion is very decidedly
in favor of the cremation of dead bodies,
under such statutory regulations as may
be necessary to prevent the destruction
of the evidence of crime, as soon as the
state of public sentiment will warrant it,
yet we consider the reasoning of the
learned judge in support of his conclusion that cremation is not illegal very un-

satisfactory; and we are of the opinion
that the authorities referred to by him
in his opinion support the conclusion that
it is the duty of the executor or other person having charge of a dead body, except
where a different disposition is authorized
by statute, to bury it and not to burn
it, and that such will continue to be his
duty till public sentiment is so changed
as to demand and procure legislation
authorizing cremation, a consummation
which in the more thickly settled coimunities at least, is most devoutly to be
wished, and must eventually be attained.
Whether cremation is a misdemeanor
or not, is another and different question;
for it may be illegal and yet not be a
criminal offence. If it is not illegal, it
of course cannot be a crime. Perhaps
on this branch of the case the opinion
of the learned judge is not so open to
criticism, for no one can say that cremation properly conducted is "on plain,
undeniable grounds, highly mischievous,
or grossly scandalous." To us it seems
quite the contrary.
The American cases upon the subject
of property in dead bodies, in many of
which the subject of burial is incidentally
congidered, will be found collected in the
note to Williams v. Williams, already
referred to.
MAnsInALL D. EWELL.

Chicago.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
WILLIAM ORT v. MARY FOWLER.
Where a party in full possession of all his faculties and able to read, even
though slowly and with difficulty, signs a negotiable and promissory note under the
belief that it is an instrument of a different character, and does so without himself
reading the instrument but relying on the reading and representations of a stranger, the execution of the note under these circumstances is such negligence on his part
as will render him liable thereon to a bona fide holder.
VOL. XXX= -72
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Where a party executes a note to the order of a fictitious firm, and thereafter
the holder endorses the note in the firm's name, a bona fide endorsee may recover
against the maker, and this" notwithstanding the latter was ignorant of the fact
that the firm name was fictitious.
One who has for a considerable time been engaged in a business which necessitates the frequent comparison of handwritings, and who shows that he has in fact
been in the habit of making such comparisons, is qualified as an expert to testify
as to the genuineness of a disputed signature by comparison with others admitted
to be genuine.
Where the principal negligence charged against the defendant is the failure to
read the instrument which he signed, when he had the ability to read, proof of the
latter fact is important, and a practical test by handing him certain instruments
and asking him to read them before the jury is both satisfactory and proper.

ERROR from Harvey county.

Affirmed.

John Reid, for plaintiff in error.
Green J- Shaver, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BREWER, J.-February 7th 1881, Fowler, as and for her bill of
particulars, filed with a justice of the peace an instrument in writing, of which the following is a copy:
"$90.
Macon Town, Kansas, Aug. 2d 1880.
"Six months after date I promise to pay to the order of Wilson,
Parks & Co., 90, for value received, with interest at the rate of
ten per cent. per annum from date. The payee reserves the right
to extend the time of payment thereof if he desires.
WILLIAM ORT."

On the back of said instrument was the following, "Wilson,
Parks & Co." A summons was issued by the justice and served
upon the defendant. Defendant appeared, and before the trial
filed with .the justice his affidavit denying that there then was or
ever had been any firm, partnership or corporation doing business
under the name of Wilson, Parks & Co.; denying that he ever had
any dealings with any person or persons representing himself or
themselves as such partnership or corporation; denying that any
persons doing business under the name of Wilson, Parks & Co.,
endorsed or authorized the endorsement of such partnership or corporate name upon the back of the instrument sued on; and also
.denying the execution by him of the instrument sued on. April
1st 1881, the cause was tried before the justice and judgment ren-
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dered for plaintiff for the amount then due by the terms of said
instrument. The defendant appealed to the district court where,
on October 5th 1881, a trial was had before the court and jury,
and a, verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff. Defendant's
motion for a new trial being overruled, he brings the case here for
review. On the trial these facts uncontradicted appeared from the
testimony of the defendant. On or about the day of the date of the
note a stranger came to wher'e defendant was working alone in the
field about half a mile from his house. The man represented himself as the state agent of Wilson, Parks & Co. for the sale of iron
posts and wire fences, and after some conversation persuaded defendant to accept an agency for his township. What followed is
thus narrated by defendant in his testimony: "The man then
filled up two contracts of agency. They were both the same size
and shape, and looked just alike. They were about half the size
of an ordinary sheet of legal cap, with a border all around near the
edge. I did not have my spectacles with me, I did not ask him for
a written contract, he said he would do it himself. He said that
as I hadn't my specs with me he would read the contract. I held
one in my hand and looked over his shoulder while he read. He
' did not read anything about a note, and I know they were iot
notes. We had no talk about signing notes. I could see a little
better then than now, but I could not read without spelling out
every word. I tried to follow him as he read. I expected him to
read the contract right, as I could not spell it out good myself
without my spectacles. He read it just as we had talked. I was
to have a commission on all I sold, but I don't remember how much
it was. The man then signed them, and then I signed them one
at a time on the back of his book. There were no other papers on
the book at the time. He then told me to take my choice, and I
took one. There was.nothing said about a promissory note in connection with the contract of agency. The contract does not say
anything about a note either. It did not read that way. I only
signed my name twice, and that was to the two contracts. I did
not intend to, and did not sign anything but the contracts. We
did not talk about signing anything else. I know the papers I
signed were just the same, and they said contract or agreement at
the top. I know they were not notes." It is very evident from
this and the other testimony that the defendant has been made the
victim of an atrocious swindle. Obviously this stranger under the
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pretence of obtaining defendant's signature to two contracts, obtained his signature to this note, or else having obtained his signature to the contracts forged it to the note. Clearly the defendant
had no thought of signing a note and did not suppose he was doing
it. The plaintiff claimed as a bona fide purchaser before maturity.
Now the first question which we deem important to consider is that
presented by these two instructions.
2. The law is that where one of two innocent parties must suffer because of the fraud of another that one must suffer who by his
own negligence made it possible for the fraud to be committed. If
therefore you believe from the evidence that defendant negligently
signed the note in question under the belief that he was signing an
ordinary contract for the agency for the sale of certain wire fence
material in Halstead township, and delivered the same to the
agent of Wilson, Parks & Co., and that said note was assigned to
plaintiff for a valuable consideration, and before it became due and
he knew nothing of the fraud practised upon defendant at the time
of the purchase of-said note, then plaintiff is entitled to recover
the amount of the note and interest and this regardless of the fact
whether there ever was such a firm in existence as the firm of Wil1
son, Parks & Co. or not.
3. If the note was procured from the defendant without any
negligence on his part by fraud and trickery and without any consideration, then plaintiff cannot recover; but the mere relying upon
the reading and word of a stranger, if such was the fact, would be
evidence of such negligence on the part of the defendant as would
make him liable for the amount of the note in the hands of an innocent holder for.value.
There is no serious question as to the general proposition that,
when one of two innocent parties must suffer by reason of the fraud
of a third, that one must suffer who by his own negligence made it
possible for the fraud to be committed. But the point of objection
is in the affirmation that the mere relying upon thd reading and
word of a stranger is such negligence as will make the party so
relying liable for the amount of the note in the hands of a bona
fide holder. This presents a serious and doubtful question, one
upon which courts have differed. A party is betrayed into signing
a bill or note bythe assurance that it is an instrument of a different
kind. Under what circumstances ought he to be liable thereon.
One .iew entertained is that as he never intended to execute a
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bill or note, it cannot be considered his act, and he should not be
held liable thereon any more than if his name had been forged to
such an instrument. A second view is that it is always a question
of fact for the jury whether under the circumstances the party was
guilty of negligence, and a third is the view adopted by the trial
court, that as matter of law one must be adjudged guilty of such
negligence as to render him liable, who, possessed of all his faculties and able to read, signs-a bill or note relying upon the assurance
or the reading of a stranger, that it is a different instrument. We
approve of the latter doctrine. It presents a case of course of
which one of the innocent parties must suffer, but the bona fide
holder is not only innocent but free from all negligence. He has done
only that which a prudent, careful man might properly do, while
on the other hand the maker of the note has omitted ordinary care
and prudence. A party cannot guard against forgery, but if in
possession of his faculties and able to read, he can know the character of every instrument to which he puts his signature, and it is
a duty which he owes to any party who may be subsequently affected
by his act to know what it is which he signs. By his signature he
invites the credence of the world to every statement and promise
which is in the instrument he has subscribed, and he is guilty of
negligence if he omits to use the ordinary means of ascertaining
what those provisions and statements are. If he has eyes and can
see he ought to examine, if he can read he ought to read; and he
has no right to send his signature out into the world affixed to an
instrument of whose contents he is ignorant. If he relies -uponthe
word of a stranger, he makes that stranger his agent. He adopts
his reading as his own knowledge. What his agent knows he
knows, and he cannot disaffirm the acts of that agent done within
the scope of the authority he has intrusted to him. In support of
the views first suggested may be cited the cases of Walker v. Ebert,
29 Wis. 196; Kellogg v. Steiner, Id. 627 ; Taylor v. Atchison, 54
Ill. 196. Though this case seems to have been rested on a statute
and to recognise the common law to be as held by us: Puffer
v. Smith, 57 Ill.'527; Wait v. Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 425; Gibbs v.
Linabury, 22 Id. 479; Soper v. Peck, S. C. Mich., 17 N.W. Rep.
57; Briggs v. Ewart, 51 Mo. 245; Cline v. Guthrie, 42 Ind.
227; Detwiler v. Bish, 44 Id. 70.
In support of the view approved by us may be cited 1 Daul. on
Negotiable Inst., sect. 850; Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. 45;
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Douglass v. Mattinq, 29 Ia. 498; Chapman v. Rose, 56 N. Y.
137; Shirts i. Overjohn, 60 Mo. 305; Dinsmore v. Stimbert, S. 0.
Nebraska, 11 N. W. Rep. 872; Mackey v. Peterson, S. 0. Minn.
13 N. W. Rep. 132; Hopkins v. ins. Co., 57 Ia. 206.
Inc a Danl., supra, the author thus states the rule, "the sixth
class of cases are those in which the party possesses the ordinary
faculties and knowledge, and is betrayed into signing a bill or note
by the assurance that it is an instrument of a different kind. It is
generally agreed that if the party is guilty of any negligence in
signing the paper he is bound; and the act itself, it seems to us,
can hardly be committed without negligence. A man has no right
to have eyes and see not; or ears and hear not; and while the law
should protect those who suffer from the want of the senses in their
proper development, or ordinary education, it should not permit
those who have both capacity and education to throw the burden
of their failure to use them upon innocent third parties. In such
cases we should say the act of signing the paper without intending
to do so, imported negligence per se, and rendered the party liable." In 60 Mo. the syllabus is as follows: "Where it appears
that the party sought to be charged intended to bind himself by
some obligation in writing, and voluntarily signed his name to what
he supposed to be the obligation he intended to execute, having full
and unrestricted means of ascertaining for himself the true character of such instrument before sigihing it but neglecting to avail
himself of such means; but relying upon the representations of
another as to the contents of the instrument, signed and delivered
a promissory note instead of the instrument be intended to sign,
he cannot be heard to impeach its validity in the hands of a bona
fide holder."
The case from Minnesota is a strong case. In that it appeared
that Peterson supposed he was signing a receipt for a plow.
It was read to him'by the agent and read as such ; Peterson could
not read English, and there were no persons within a half mile
who could do so ; the court excluded the evidence, that it was obtained by fraud, on the ground "that where a party through neglect
of precaution within his power affixes his name to that kind of a
paper without knowing its character, the consequent loss ought not
to be shifted from him to a bona fide purchaser of the paper.
Tested by this rule, the facts which defendant offered to prove,
would be no defence. He signed the paper voluntarily."
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In 56 N. Y., the court by JOHNSON, J., well says, "to insure
irresponsibility only the utmost carelessness, coupled with a little
friendly fraud, will be essential. Paper in abundance will be found
afloat, the makers of which will have had no idea they were signing notes, and will have trusted readily to the assurance of whoever procured it that it created no obligation. To avoid such
evils it is necessary, at least to hold firmly to the doctrine that he
who, by his carelessness or undue confidence, has enabled another
to obtain the money of an innocent per-son, shall answer the loss.
If it be objected that there must be a duty of care, in order to
found an allegation of negligence upon the neglect of it, it must be
answered that every man is bound to know that he may be deceived
in respect to the contents of a paper which he signs without reading. When he signed an obligation without ascertaining its character or extent, which he has the means to do, upon the representations of another, he puts confidence in that person; and if injury
ensues to an innocent third person by reason of that confidence,
his act is the means of the injury, and he ought to answer to it."
We think, therefore, the ruling of the district court in this respect
was correct and must be sustained.
The second question we shall notice is this. Plaintiff introduced
the testimony of experts to prove by comparison of handwriting
that the signature to the note was that of defendant. In respect
to the genuineness of this signature six witnesses were introduced,
two of whom testified that they were acquainted with the handwriting of defendant, while the others testified only from the comparison of this signature with certain other signatures admitted by
defendant to be genuine. That this kind of testimony is competent
can no longer be considered an open question in this court: Macomber v. Scott, 10 Kans. 335; Joseph v. Bank, 17 Id. 256;
Abbott v. Coleman, 22 Id. 250. But the claim of counsel is that
these witnesses did not show themselves to be technically experts.
Without attempting to notice the testimony of these witnesses we
may say in general that each of the four, with perhaps the exception of the county treasurer, H. W. Bunker, showed that he had
been for a length of time engaged in a business which necessitated
the comparisons of signatures, and that he bad in fact been in the
habit of making such comparisons. Whether in the case of the
witness Bunker the mere fact that he had been county treasurer,
was enough to show him familiar with the comparison of bandwrit-
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ing and therefore competent as an expert, may be doubted, but as to
the others they. were clearly within the rule. It is not necessary
in order to make a man an expert and qualified to testify as to the
comparison of handwritings that he should have made such comparisons a single specialty. It is enough that he has been engaged
in some business which calls for frequent comparisons and that he
has in fact been in the habit for a length of time of making such
comparisons. Of course the value of such testimony will vary with
different witnesses, and this is a matter to be determined by the jury
after hearing the witnesses state the extent to which they have been
in the habit of making such comparisons. It is enough now to say
that each of these witnesses, with perhaps the exception of the witness Bunker, was competent. The third question we shall consider
is this. The first instruction given was as follows : "If the jury
believe from the evidence that defendant signed the note in question and delivered it to a person representing himself to be an
agent df Wilson, Parks & Co., and that said person assigned and
delivered the note to the agent of the plaintiff, for a good consideration, and the plaintiff is now the owner and holder of the note,
then you will find for the plaintiff for the amount of the note and
interest." In explanation of this instruction it may be remarked
that the party who obtained the note represented himself as the
agent of Wilson, Parks & Co., a firm doing business in Quincy,
Illinois, and that within a day or two after its execution plaintiff
purchased the note from a party representing himself as the agent
of such firm, who at the time endorsed the firm's name. The defendant in his affidavit of denial alleged that ihere was no such
firm as Wilson, Parks & Co. He introduced the deposition of certain witnesses from Quincy, Illinois, tending strongly to show that
there was no such firm at that place. There was no counter testimony and no contradiction by plaintiff of such claim and testimony
of defendant. It left the case in such condition that the court was
justified in assuming that there was no such firm, that the payee's
name therefore was fictitious. Under these circumstances the instruction was correct: 1 Danl. on Negotiable Insts., sect. 139;
Rogers v. Ware, 2 Neb. 29 Farnsworth v. Drake, 11 Ind.101;
Forbes v. .syy, 21 Ohio St. 474; Blodgett v. Jackson, 40 N. H.
21; Lane v. Kekle, 22 Ia. 399; Phillipsv. Inthum, 18 C. B.
N. S. 694.
In 1 Danl., supra, the author thus expresses the rule, "in the
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case of a note payable to a fictitious person, it appears to be well
settled that any bona fide holder may recover on it against the
maker as upon a note payable to bearer. It will be no defence
against such bona fide holder for the maker to set up that he did
not know the payee to be fictitious. By making it payable to such
person he avers his existence, and he is estopped as against a holder
ignorant of the contrary to assert the fiction. Where a note has
as its payee a fictitious firm, and the holder endorses it assuming
the firm's name, a bona fide endorsee may recover against the
maker."
These are all the substantial questions. There remain two or
three minor matters which perhaps we ought to notice. Plaintiff
asked the defendant if he had not been in almost constant litigation for the last seven or eight years.
Again, in deciding a question on the admissibility of testimony
the court stated the rule of law applicable to cases of this kind,
and followed it by a statement of its own experience while engaged
in the practice. As the court overruled the above question, and as
the rule announced was in harmony with that given in the instructions and which we have just now examined and approved, and
as the experience stated was also in accord with that rule, we cannot think that the substantial rights of the defendant were in any
way prejudiced.
Again, it is insisted that the court erred in requiring the defendant at the instance of the plaintiff to take two or three papers and
read them in the hearing of the jury. As the principal fact of
negligence charged against the defendant was the failure to read
when he had the ability to read, proof of the latter was important
and an actual test in the court room before the jury as permitted
was a very satisfactory and we think a proper test.
We see nothing else requiring notice, Upon the main and pivotal
questions the ruling of the court was correct, and therefore the
judgment must be affirmed.
All the justices concurring.
One of the principal questions discussed in the particular case, has to do
with the right of a bona fide holder of
negotiable paper to recover thereon, as
against a maker whose signature has
been procured in reliance upon fraudnlent representations as to the character
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of the instrument. In connection with
that question, so satisfactorily considered
by the learned justice writing the opinion in the particular case, we shall
briefly direct attention to the rights of
bonafide holders of negotiable paper.
1. We notice, in the first place, that

ORT v. FOWLER.
a bonafide holder cannot recover upon a
forged note or.bill: Bank of Bengal v.
Fagan, 7 Moore P C. 72; Harrop v.
Fisher, 30 L. J. C. P. 283; Carpenter
v. Bank, 123 lass. 66. Casco Bank v.
Keene, 53 Afe. 104; Dow v. Spenny, 29
Mlo. 390 ; Citizens' State Bank v. Adams,
91 Ind. 280.
There are, of course, exceptions to
this rule: as where a party adopts a
forged signature as his own; or where,
by some conduct on his part, he is estopped from denying the genuineness of the
signature.
2. A bonafide holder, without notice,
cannot recoTer from the maker on a
negotiable instrument which has been
materially altered, without his know]edge or consent. These alterations may
consist in changing the date, the time or
place of payment, the amount of principal or interest to be paid, the medium
of payment, or the number or relations
of the parties, or in the character and
effect of the instrument: 2 Daniel's
Negot. Instr.,
1375. In these cases
there can be no recovery, even by a bona
fide holder: Master v. Miller, 4 Term
R. 320; Wade v. Withington, I Allen
(Mkass.) 562 ; Greenfield Bank v. Stowell, 123 Mass. 196; Holmes v. Trumper,
22 Mich. 427 ; Gerrish v. Glines, 56 N.
H. 9; Scofield v. Ford, 56 Ia. 370 ;
Knoxville NationalBank v. Clark, 51 Id.
264; Laub v. Paine, 46 Id. 550.
There are exceptions however to this
rule, as there were to the preceding.
And it is well settled that when the
drawer of the bill or the maker of the
note has by his own negligent or careless
execution of the instrument afforded an
opportunity for alteration, which alteration has been made without -defacing the
instrument, or exciting the suspicions of
a careful person a bona .fide holder in
such case is allowed to recover.
3. When a statute not only prohibits
the making of a contract, but declares
that the same shall be void, a note which

embodies such a contract, or is based
upon such consideration, is void in the
hands of a bona fide holder: Bayley v.
Taber, 5 Mass. 286; Clark v. Pease,
41 N. H. 414; Aurora v. West, 22 Ind.
88 ; Taylor 4 Beck, 3 Rand. 316 ; Weed
v. Bond, 21 Ga. 195; Batch v. Burroughs, 1 Wood 439. In the case last
cited the rule is stated as follows ."In
those cases in which the legislature has
declared that the illegality of the contract or consideration shall make the
security, whether bill or note, void, the
defendant may insist on such illegality,
though the plaintiff or some other party
between him and the defendants took the
bill bona fide and gave a valuable consideration for it. But unless the instrument has been expressly declared void
by the legislature, illegality of consideration will be no defence in an action at
the suit of a bona fide holder for value
without notice of the illegality, unless
he obtained the bill after it became due :"
See Johnson v. Meeker, I Wis. 436;
Norris v. Langley, 19 N. H. 423; Converse v. Foster, 32 Vt. 828 ; Gould v.
Armstrong, 2 Hall 266; City Bank v.
Barnard, 1 Id. 70; Cazet v. Field, 9
Gray 329.
4. A negotiable instrument cannot be
enforced, even by a bona flde holder,
against a maker who was at the time
the note was made, incapable of entering into a contract. A bona jide holder
cannot enforce payment: "When the
maker belongs to a class of persons who
are ordinarily, and as a general rule, on
grounds of public policy, held incompetent to contract at all, such as infants,
married women, alien enemies, and insane persons, including spendthrifts and
others under guardianship, who have
been by some statute declared incompetent to contract:" Daniel's Neg.
Ins., 806 ; Bigelow's Bills and Notes
512; McClain v. Davis, 77 Ind. 419
Clark v. Pease, 41 N. H. 414.
That lunacy constitutes a defence even
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as against a bona fide holder, Wirebach
v. Bank, 97 Penn St. 543; M1oore v.
Hershey, 90 Id. 196. But when the
note in its inception was taken in good
fhith from one incompetent to do business, the holder can recover on the note,
provided he had no notice of the maker's
want of capacity in a transaction not calculated to put him on his guard: Shoulters
v. Allen, 16 N. W. Rep. 888; s. c. 51
Mich. 529.
So coverture is a defence, even as
against a bona fide holder of negotiable
paper executed by a married woman:
.Tohnson v. Sutherland, 39 Mich. 579;
Kenton Ins. Co. v. McClellan, 43 Id.
564.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has laid down the rule as to drunkenness
as follows: "If a man voluntarily deprives himself of the use of his reason
by strong drink, why should be not be
responsible to an innocent party for the
acts which he performs when in that
condition? It seems to me that lie ought,
on the principle that where a loss must
be borne by one of two innocent persons, it should be borne by him who has
occasioned it. * * * But there is another and controlling reason for holding
the maker liable to the endorsee in such
case, founded on principles of public
policy and the necessities of commerce.
The exigencies of trade require that
there should be no unnecessary impediments to the ready circulation and currency of negotiable paper, but that it
should be left free to pass from hand to
hand, like bank notes, and perform the
functions of money, untrammelled by
any equities or defences between the
original parties. If, then, it should be
held that the drunkenness of the maker
avoids the note in the hands of the endorsee, it is obvious that such a rule
would greatly clog and embarrass the
circulation of commercial paper, for no
man could safely take it without ascertaining the condition of the maker or
drawer when it was given, although

there might be nothing suspicious in its
appearance or unusual in the character
of the signature :" MeSparran v. Neeley, 91 Penn. St. 24 ; State Bank v. McCoy, 69 Id. 204.
5. Where a bill or note has been
delivered as an escrow to a third party
to hold until a certain event happens or
certain conditions are complied with and
has been delivered in violation of the
condition, a bona fide holder may recover: Smith v. Moberly, 10 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 269; Taylor v. Craig, 2 J. J.
Marsh. (Ky.) 460; Deardorff v. Foresman, 24 Ind. 481 ; Merriamv. Bockwood,
47 N. H. 81 ; Gage v. Sharp, 24 Iowa
15 ; McCreamer v. Thompson, 21 Id.
244; Clark v. Tayer, 105 Mass. 216 ;
Ward v. Hackett, 30 Minn. 150, s.c.
44 Am. R. 187.
6. Where a bill or note has been signed
and is complete in form, but before delivery has been stolen from the possession
of the party who has signed it and passed
to a bona .fideholder for value, the rule
is that the want of delivery cannot be
set up to defeat the recovery of such
holder: Worcester County Bank v. Dorchester, g-c., Bank, 10 Cash. (Mass.)
488; Shipley v. Carroll, 45 111. 285;
Clark v. Johnson, 54 Ill. 296; Gould v.
Segee, 5 Duer 270.
A different principle is applied where
the instrument was signed but was incomplete at the time it was stolen, there
being no delivery in trust. " In such
cases, no trust for any purpose has been
created. No instrument has been perfected. No appearance of validity has
been given it. No negligence can be
Therefore if the blank be
imputed.
filled, it is slicer forgery, in which the
maker is in no wise involved and lie is
not therefore bound, even to a bonafide
I Daniel on
holder without notice."
Negotiable Instruments, 841.
7.Where an instrument has been lost,
while the finder acquires no title against
the real owner, yet if it was endorsed in
blank, or was payable to bearer, the one
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to whom the finder transfers it, will if he
be a bona :fide .holder for value, before
maturity and without notice of loss, be
able to enforce payment against any
party, maker or endorser liable thereon;
Murrayv. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110.
8. A bona fide holder for a valuable
consideration paid before maturity, can
enforce the payment of a note originally
obtained by duress: Chitty on Bills 79 ;
Smith's Mercantile Law 320 ; Clark v.
Pease, 41 N. H. 414 ; Farmers'and lechanics' Bank v. Butler, 48 Mich. 192.
9. Where a man negligently signs
a negotiable paper, he cannot defend
against it in the hands of a bona ,fide
holder and ordinarily, one who signs a
note without reading it is guilty of negligenc : Baldwin v. Barrows, 86 Ind.
351 ; Woollen v. Whiteacre, 73 Id. 198 ;
Ruddell v. Fhalor, 72 Id. 533 ; Cornell
v. Nebeker, 58 Id. 425 ; Woollen v.
Ulich, 64 Id. 120 ; Nell v. Smith, 64
Id. 214 ; Thomas v. Ruddell, 66 Id. 326 ;
Maxwell v. Morehart, 66 Id. 301; Indiana
National Bank v. Weckerly, 67 Id. 345 ;
Citizens' National Bank v. Smith, 55 N.
H. 593; Douglass v. Matting, 29 Iowa
498 ; Shirts v. Ovejohn, 60 Mo. 305;
Chapman v. Rose, 56 N. Y. 137.
In Nebecker v. Cutsinger, 48 Ind. 436,
it is laid down that "where a man who
can without difficulty read, executes a
negotiable note without reading it, trusting to the party to whom it is executed
for a statement of its contents, or trusting to the reading of it by the latter,
there being no substantial reason shown
for not reading it himself, he is guilty of
negligence."
In De Camp v. Hamma, 29 Ohio St.
467, 471, it is laid down that there
"can be no doubt that a person possessing the ordinary faculties and being
able to read and write, who relies solely
on the representation of the other contracting party as to the character of the
instrument, should be regarded as negligent as against an innocent indorsee
In
before maturity and for value."

Hopkins v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 57 Iowa
207, it is laid down that it is incumbent upon the party executingan instrument to exercise reasonable care and
diligence to ascertain its contents. In
Anderson v. Walter, 34 Mich. 113, it is
said, "It would seem to be a self-evident
proposition that where a party to an
instrument undertakes to read it over in
the presence and hearing of the other
party thereto, in order that he may
understand its contents before signing it,
the party reading is both legally and
morally bound to read it correctly and
the other interested party has a right to
rely upon its being so read and need not
examine it himself. These papers were
compared in the usual and customary
manner, and ordinarily no negligence
can be attributed to one who signs
papers, after having heard them compared, without any farther or other examination."
The question whether negligence is a
question of law or a question of fact is
considered in the principal case, and
the authorities are collected. Nothing
more need be said in this connection
on that point. It may be of interest,
however, to note the following from the
Supreme Court of Indiana. "When a
negotiable promissory note has been obtained by fraud as to the character of
the paper, the maker signing in time belief that it was a different contract, the
question whether he was negligent in
signing, or in failing to ascertain the
character of the paper is ordinarily one
of fact ; but if the plea purports to set
out all the facts and circumstances under which the note was obtained, the
question may be decided upon demurrer
as one of law: Webb v. Corbin, 78 Ind.
403.
As to cases in which one who cannot
read signs negotiable paper believing it
to be something else, we quote from the
same court in the case last above cited
as follows: "A man who cannot read
must necessarily repose confidence in
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those with whom he deals, and, if they
falsely read an instrument to him, he is
not to be deemed negligent simply from
the fact that he irusts them, and signs
the paper upon the faith of tile
information thus furnished him.
It may be
that an illiterate man who is unable to
read will, in some cases, be guilty of
negligence in not having the paper read
to him by one whom he knows to be disinterested ; but whether he is so or not
must generally be a question for the
jury."
In the following cases the maker who
could not read, has been held liable for
negligence in signing the paper: Williams
v. Stoll, 79 Ind. 80 ; s. c.41 Am. Rep.
604 ; Fsherv. Von Behren, 70 Ind. 19;
Indiana Nat. Bank v. Wekerley, 67 Id.
346; Perkins v. White, 36 Ohio St. 530,
539; Roach v. Karr, 18 Kans. 529 ;
Fayette County Savings Bank v. Steffes,
54 Ia. 214.
In Walker v.Ebert, 29 Wis. 194, the
maker who was unable to read or write
the English language was held not liable. See too Taylor v. Atchison, 54
Ill. 196, 199; Pennsylvania Railroad
Co. v. Shay, 82 Penn. St. 202 ; Grifflths
v. Kellogg, 39 Wis. 290.
10. We note the well-established principle that ordinarily the holder of the
instrument need not prove a consideration. His possession of the instrument
is primafade evidence of his title and
right thereto: Vallett v. Parker, 6
Wend. 615, 621 ; Wayland University
v. Boorman, 56 Wis. 657 ; Wilson Sewing Ilachine v. Spears, 50 Mich. 534 ;
Waynesville Nat. Bank v. Irons, 8 Fed.
Rep. 1 ; Stoddard v. Burton, 41 Ia.
582 ; Rubey v. Culbertson, 35 Id. 264.
The above rule is subject to exceptions to which attention will be called.
11. Where a negotiable promissory
note is obtained from a promissor by
fraud, and has been transferred before
maturity to a third person, the above
rule is not applied and the burden is
on him to show that he purchased it for
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value and in good faith: Sullivan v.
Langley, 120 Mass. 437; Smith v. Livingston, 111 Id. 342; Dingman v. Amsink, 77 Penn. St. 114; Simpson v. Del
Hoyo, 94 N. Y. 189; Mitchell v. Tomlinson, 91 Ind. 167, 172.
12. So where a note has been made
for an illegal consideration the burden
is on an indorsee to show that he gave
value and in good faith: Emerson v.
Burns, 114 Mass. 348 ; Sistermans v.
Field, 9 Gray (Mass.) 331 ; Paton v.
Coit, 5 Mich. 508; Wyat v. Campbell,
1 M. & M. 80 ; Bailey v. Bidwell, 13
Id. 73; Fitch v. Jones, 5 El. & Bl.
238; Bingham v. Stanley, 2 Ad. & El.
(N. S.) 117 ; Garland v. Lane, 46 N.
H. 245; Rock Island Nat. Bank v. Ndson, 41 Ia. 563.
13. So where a note has been wrongfully put into circulation, as where delivered in escrow and put into circulation in betrayal of the trust, the burden
is on the holder to show that he paid
value: Vallett v. Parker, 6 Wend. 615;
Munroe v. Cooper, 5 Pick. 412.
14. And so the same is true where
the note has been lost or stolen : 3filler v. Race, I Burr. 452; Grant v.
Vaughan, 3 Id. 1526.
15. One who holds negotiable paper
by unimpeachable title may transfer a
like title to one aware of original defects or equities: Most v. Bender, 25
Mich. 516; Shaw v. Clark, 49 Id. 384;
Wood v. Starling, 48 Id. 592 ; Simon v.
Merritt, 33 Ia. 537; Hoffman v. Bank
of Milwaukee, 12 Wall. 181 ; Hereth v.
Merchants' Nat. Bank, 34 lnd. 380.
16. It is equally well settled that
under certain circumstances one whose
title to the paper is impeachable may
transfer an unimpeachable title to one
who takes without notice of any equities.
Thus it is laid down, "That the purchaser or holder of a negotiable instrument, who has taken it (1) bona fide,
(2) for a valuable consideration, (3) in
the ordinary course of business, (4)
when it was not overdue, (5) without
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notice of its dishonor, and (6) without
notice of facts which impeach its validity
as between antecedent parties, has a
title unaffected by those facts, and may
recover on the instrument, although it
may be without any legal validity be-

tween the parties :" 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, J 769. And see
Hatch v. Burroughs, I Wood 438.
HEnRT WADE ROoRS.
Ann Arbor.

ircuit Court, Southern District M
DAVIS v. DUNCAN,

i ipi.

RECEIVER, AND ANOTHER.

The discharge of a receiver of a corporation by the court and the restoration of
the property to the corporation, without any reservation of jurisdiction as to existing
rights of action, discharges both the receiver and the property from liability to suit
for injuries inflicted through the negligence of agents or employees of the receiver.
If in the decree discharging the receiver it had been provided that the property
should be subject to existing claims, the court would have retained jurisdiction over
it to that extent.
A receiver is not personally liable for the torts of his employees, and proceedings
against him for such tort are in the nature of proceedings in rem. Nor is the corof the receiver's employees committed while it was out
poration liable for the torts
of possession.
After entering an order discharging a receiver, and directing him to turn over the
property in his hands to the defendant corporation, which order was complied
with by the receiver, the court cannot, after the adjournment of the term at which
the order was made and entered of record, in any way alter, change, modify, or
expand the decree discharging the receiver, and again obtain jurisdiction over the
property and funds which it had by its decree ordered the receiver to turn over to
the corporation.
The fact that the receiver was also the president of the corporation can make no
difference. It is the corporation that holds the property and not the president ; he
is only the official agent of the corporation.
Although permission has been granted by a court to sue its receiver, the right of
the receiver to set up any defence he may have is reserved ; and this can be done by
plea, answer, or demurrer.
DEMURRER to
L.

Bill.

T. Bradhaw and L. Brame, for complainant.

. L. Russell, B.
ants.

B.

Boone, and Frank Johnson, for defend-

The opinion of the court was delivered by
HILL, J.-The question for decision in this cause arises upon
defendants' demurrer to complainant's bill.

The bill in substance

DAVIS v. DUNCAN.

states and charges fliat defendant Duncan, in a suit in equity pending in this court, was duly appointed a receiver of the Mobile and
Ohio Railroad, and the property belonging to said company; that,
acting as such, he was, on the- nineteenth day of January, 1883,
engaged by his agents, servants, and employees as a common carrier of passengers for hire over said road; that complainant was a
passenger on one of the trains, having paid his fare to the town of
West Point, on said road; that the night was dark when the train
arrived at that place, and there were no lights to enable passengers
to see in getting off the train; that while attempting to get off the
train, without any sigpnal, the train made a sudden start, which
caused a jerk, by which he was suddenly thrown against the platform, and his thigh bone was broken, and other injuries were inflicted upon his person, from which he has suffered much pain
. of body and mind, and has been at great expense in being cured
of these injuries, some of which he fears may attend him through
life; and that in consequence of these injuries he has been unable
to attend to his business affairs, and ha' thereby been ruined in
fortune, and has suffered damage to the sum of $15,000 by reason
of the negligent and wrongful acts of the conductor, engineer, and
employees of said Duncan, and for which he claims damages in the
said sum of $15,000. The bill further charges that on the tenth
day of February, 1883, in the matter of said receivership, a decree was made and entered in this court, approving and confirming
all the accounts and dealings of said Duncan, and accepting his
resignation and discharging him as receiver, upon condition that he
should produce and file in this court, the acquittance and receipt
of said Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company in full settlement, as set
forth in said decree, but that he has not done so, as -complainant is
informed and believes, and charges that said resignation has not
been accepted and said receiver discharged.. That said Duncan, in
applying for his discharge, led the court to believe that all matters
except pending suits, by and against him as receiver, had been settled, and that therefore it was unnecessary to .continue said receivership except for the purposes of pending suits or actions, and that
said Duncan must be held chargeable with knowledge of his complainant's said injuries, and his right to compensation out of the
property and assets in his hands as such receiver, and that he did
not bring notice of the same to the court when said order of discharge was made, and that complainant had no notice of the pro-
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posed surrender of said receivership, and never did have notice of
said proceedings until shortly before the filing of this bill, on the
twenty-eighth of December, 1883, and insists that he ought not to
be affected by the same. The bill further alleges that said Duncan
was the president of said Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company, and
one of its directors, at the time of the injuries, and at the time of
the surrender of said railroad and its property, and still is ; that a
large portion of the railroad and property so surrendered is in the
state of Mississippi, and in the possession of said Duncan; and
that the rights of no third parties have intervened.

These are all the charges in the bill that need be stated to an understanding of the questions presented by the demurrer. It is
agreed that in considering the demurrer the decree discharging the
receiver, as entered, may be considered by the court, as if set forth
in the bill. The proceedings in this court were in aid of and ancillary to the proceeding in the circuit court of the United States
for the Southern district of Alabama, where the main suit was
instituted and terminated; consequently, this court adopted as its
decree the decrees of that court, so far as they related to settling
the rights of the parties to the suit and the discharge of the receiver, settling only by its own independent decrees the rights and'
liabilities growing out of the receivership between the receiver and
third parties within the jurisdiction of this court. The decree of
the said circuit court for the Southern district of Alabama was
-made on the twenty-fourth day of January, 1883, and recited that
said Duncan, as receiver, had fully accounted with the court for all
his acts as such receiver, and was ready to surrender all the property in his hands as such, and which the railroad company was
ready and willing to receive. Whereupon the court "ordered,
adjudged, and decreed that said William Butler Duncan do, with
all convenient speed, deliver all the property in his possession as
receiver, under the former order of this court, in the states of
Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee and Kentucky, to the said Mobile
& Ohio Railroad Company, to be by said corporation managed and
operated as authorized by its charter, and upon the filing in this
court by said Duncan of the acquittance and receipt of said railroad company, as directed by the former order of this court, the
resignation of said receivership by said Duncan is hereby accepted,
and he and his sureties forever discharged from all liability as said
receiver, except that all pending actions and suits by or against
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said receiver shall be carried on 'and prosecuted to conclusion the
same as if the said Duncan continued the receiver of this court in
this cause." This decree was received and adopted and entered by
this court as ancillary to and in aid of the proceedings in said
cause in that court on the tenth day of February, 1883.
The bill admits that the property in the hands of the receiver
has been turned over to the railroad company, and that the acquittance and receipt was filed in that court before the filing of the bill
in this cause, but that the acquittance and receipt has not been filed
in this court. It is not denied that the bill sets forth a primafacie
claim for damages, unless the right to recover the same has been
lost by the surrender of the trust property and assets by the receiver, and his discharge before the commencement of these proThe turning over of the property and filing the
ceedings.
acquittance and receipt in the court at Mobile, was under the
decree of that court a complete discharge of the receiver, except as
to pending suits by and against Duncan as receiver. This court
only entertained jurisdiction of the case in aid of and ancillary to
the proceedings in Mobile, and only for the purpose of settling
controversies between the receiver and third parties, growing out
of the receivership. The filing of the acquittance and receipt of
the railroad company in this court was unnecessary and unimportant, and the want of which did not, in my opinion, continue the
liability of the receiver or render the property and assets turned
over by him liable for any of the acts or wrongs committed by him,
or his agents or employees.
As to all pending suits, in whatever form, by or against Duncan
as receiver, in either the circuit court of the United States, in
Alabama, or in this court, the receivership and the right to prosecute such suits to a conclusion was reserved, and any decree or
judgment against the receiver became a charge against the property
and assets so turned over, in the same manner that it would have
been had the order of discharge never been made in either court.
In other words, the railroad company took the property cum onere
as to these claims. A receiver, as such upon principle and authority, is not personally liable for the torts of his employees. Were
he so liable, few men would take the responsibility of such a trust;
it is only when he himself commits the wrong that he is held personally liable. The proceedings against him as receiver, for wrongs
of his employees, is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and renVOL. XXXII.-74
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ders the property in his hands, as such, liable for compensation for
such injuiies.. keara's Adm'r v. Holbrook, 20 Ohio St. 137;
Kein v. Jewett, 11 C. E. Green 474; Jordanv. Wells, 3 Woods
527; Kennedy v. Indianapolis & C. RailroadCo., 11 Cent. Law
J. 89. The railroad company is not liable for the injuries complained of in the bill, for the reason that they were committed
while it was out of possession of the property, and had no control
over it. This conclusion is sustained by principle and authority.
Ohio, &c., Railroad Co. v. Davis, 23 Ind, 560; Bell v. Indianapolis, &c., Railroad Co., 53 Id. 57; Metz v. Buffalo, &c., Railroad Co., 58 N. Y. 61 ; Rogers v. Mobile & 0. Railroad Co., 17
Cent. Law J. 290; Meara's Adm'r v. Holbrook, supra. There is
no 4llegation in the bill that Duncan had any agency in bringing
about the injuries complained of, or knew anything in relation
thereto when either the decree of the court at Mobile, or of this
court, discharging him as receiver, was made, and it is to be presumed that he did not have personal knowledge of the occurrence,
or that any claim was intended to be made for damages therefor.
I take it for granted that it was supposed there were no claims for
damages against the receiver, or, rather, against the property or
funds in his hands, which had not been put in suit, or a reservation
would have been made holding the funds and property liable, as
was done in favor of those in suit. I am satisfied that such was
the case, or cases like the presefit one would have been provided
for by the decree of this court in discharging the receiver, as was
done in the case of Mississippi Cent. Railroad Co.
It is very much to be regretted that this provision was not made,
as it may work a serious wrong to the complainant; but the question
is, can this court, after the adjournment of the term at which the
order was made, in any way alter, change, modify, suspend, or
expand the decree discharging the receiver, and again obtain jurisdiction of the property and funds which it had by its decree ordered
the receiver to turn over to the corporation, and which it is admitted
was done. I am not aware of any rule by which this can be done.
I do not believe that the fact that Duncan is the president of the
corporation can make any difference. It is the corporation that
holds the property, and not Duncan; he is only the official agent
of the company. The corporation took the property free from any
liens or claims growing out of the receivership, except those reserved and provided for by the decree under which the surrender
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was made to the company, and under which it is now held. - Had
the decree under which the property was turned over provided that
it should be subject to the satisfaction of all claims, whether for
personal injuries or otherwise, committed by the employees of the
receiver while the property was under his control, whether the
receiver was discharged or not, this court, as a court of equity,
would provide for a proper adjustment and payment of such claims,
as such a provision would have been a retention of jurisdiction to
that extent.
The only authority referred to by complainant's counsel in support of the proposition that the discharge of the receiver does not
operate as a discharge of the property held by him for torts committed before the discharge, is the case of Miller v. Loeb, 64 Barb.
454, referred to by High, Rec. §§ 268, 848. When that case is
examined it will be found not to apply to the case at bar. The
rule stated in that case is that the discharge of a receiver by orlder
of the court is no bar to an action against him by third persons
claiming property of which he has taken possession. When it is
alleged that the receiver has sold such property after notice of the
owner's claim thereto, the court will permit the owner to bring an
action against the receiver, notwithstanding he has been discharged,
especially where the claimant had no notice of the receiver's application for discharge. This was a case in which the receiver had
possession of the property of another, and, with kiowledge -of his
claim, sold the property.
In the present case the property in the hands of the receiver, and
which he turned over to the company n obedience to the order of
the court, never was the property of the complainant, and
could only be reached by the establishment of the claim for
damages in such way as the court might direct, and obtaining
the order of the court that the same should be paid by the receiver out of the trust property in his hands. This was not
done, and the property is now beyond the jurisdiction of this
court.
It is insisted by complainant's counsel that a receiver occupies
the position of an executor of an estate, and that the courts have
holden that the discharge of an executor does not relieve him from
liability from suit when the discharge is granted. In that case the
judgment is against the executor in his fiduciary capacity, but must
be satisfied out of any of the funds belonging to the estate in his
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hands, if any he has; if not, may be satisfied out of such property
or means as miy have passed into the possession of the devisee or
legatee, and upon which the creditor had a lien created by law for
the payment of his demand, the devisee or legatee having taken
the property cum onere. In the case at bar this relation and liability does not exist as above stated. The only authority to which
I have been referred, or have been able to find, analogous to the
present case is the case of .'armers' Loan
Trust Co. v. Railroad of Iowa, 7 Fed. Rep. 537; in which Judge LoVE, in the
circuit court of the United States for Iowa, in a very learned and
exhaustive opinion, holds that no action can be maintained against
the receiver of a railroad after such officer has been discharged and
the property transferred to a purchaser under an order of the court
in a foreclosure proceeding; and such purchaser takes the property subject to all claims against the receiver, when the court has
reserved the jurisdiction upon final decree to enforce, as a lien
upon the property, all liabilities incurred by such receiver. This
opinion was concurred in by Judge McRnAny, the circuit judge.
This ruling does not conflict with the positions stated.
It is contended by complainants' counsel that to deny the relief
prayed for is to acknowledge a right and deny a remedy, which it
is insisted is contrary to legal rules. Rights are often defeated for
the want of applying the proper remedy within the proper time,
and under which hardships are sometimes suffered; but complainant may not be altogether remediless. The employee or employees
who caused the injuries, if the receiver or the property once in his
hands was liable, are also liable, as having been the direct and
wrongful cause of the injuries. The fruits of a suit against them,
it is true, may be very uncertain.
It is insisted by complainant's counsel that the court, or one of
its judges, having given leave to file the bill against the receiver,
should not now dismiss it, but will permit the cause to proceed to
final decree, as though the receivership remained. In all such
cases the leave to bring suit in any form reserves the right to the
receiver to set up any defence he may have, which can be done by
plea, answer, or demurrer: Jordan v. Wells, supra.
After a careful consideration of all the questions involved, I am
unable to come to any other conclusion than the one that the bill
does not present a case authorizing the court to grant the relief
prayed for in the bill. While at the same time I regret that the
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final decree did not provide for this and all other claims against
the receiver, or the property and funds which were in his hands,
and to which it would have been liable had proceedings been pending when the final decree was entered.
The result is that the demurrer must be sustained and the bill
dismissed.
WHO MAT 3B RECEIVES.

The essential qualities in a receiver
are intelligence, trustworthiness, ordinary good business ability and lawful
age. Perhaps, in selecting a receiver
fbr a peculiar business, like, for example, railway operation, some attention
would be given to especial fitness in
the appointee, by reason of former education, to do the business of which he was
appointed receiver. The appointee must
also be of lawful age. The office is one
not allowing the widest discretion in the
incumbent-he being merely "the hand
of the court," and acting always under
its guidance and direction. And it may
be laid down generally that any person
is competent for a receivership. But a
receiver should not be a person interested in the suit: Att.-Gen. v. Bank of
Columbia, I Paige 511 ; Freeholders of
Midesex v. State Bank, 28 N. J. Eq.
166.
In the former case it was held that
upon proceedings against a bank for
insolvency, an officer of the corpbration
was not a proper person to be receiver.
In Richards v. Chesapeake 4- Ohio Ry.
Co., I Hugh 28, the court refused to appoint the vice-president of the defendant
company receiver, although requested by
the secured creditors. The court said :
"It appears that the railway company
is overwhelmed with debt, secured and
unsecured. How it became so is notfor
us to determine. But the court where
called upon to appoint a receiver for a
corporation totally insolvent, who is to
be the mere servant of the court, upon
whose fidelity and ability to manage during the pendency of the suit the property intrusted to him, the court must

rely, ought not, and ought not to be expected, to appoint a person under whose
charge and control the resources of the
road had been exhausted, its property
seized upon execution, and the necessity
for a receiver brought about. The receiver is rot the receiver of the bondholders or secured creditors. He is the
mere hand of the court. The unsecured
creditors whose chances are remote, have
a deep interest in knowing that the road,
while its assets are being marshalled, and
its creditors, their claims and priorities
ascertained, is free from the control of
those whose administration of its affairs
ended in bankruptcy."
In the appointment of a receiver of an
embarrassed banking corporation, whose
assets are counted by hundreds of thousands of dollars, private preferences must
yield to public considerations. The interests of all parties should rest exclusively, in this respect, on the care and
vigilance and unbiassed judgment of the
court : In re Empire City Bank, 10 How.
Pr. 498.
In Baker et al. v. Adm'r of Backus,
32 Ill.
79, the court said : "There was
a fatal objection to the person appointed
receiver. He was not disinterested ; be
was the legal adviser of the complainant
and framed the bill; he was the legal
adviser of the company; he was the
largest single creditor; allof these disqualified him, and he should not have
been appointed."
But in In re Eagle Iron Works, 8 Paige
385, it was held that upon the voluntary
dissolution of a corporation, any of its
officers or stockholders may be appointed
receivers, if not otherwise disqualified.
Where the dissolution of a corporation
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is had by Act of Assembly, or by decree of court, it is proper to appoint a
suitable person by the repealing act or a
receiver by the court to collect and apply
the assets of the annulled body in the
discharge of its liabilities, and it is competent to select another corporation, as
well as a natural person, to administer
the assets: Western N. C. Ry. Co. v.
Rollins, 82 N. C. 523. See further as
to when corporation may act as receiver:
In re Knickerbocker Bank, 19 Barb. 602.
And generally as to who may be receivers: Sutton v. Jones, 15 Yes. 584;
v. Jolland, 8 Id. 72 ; Sykes v. Hastings, 11 Id. 363; Newport v. Bury, 23
Beav. 30; Bolles v. Duff, 54 Barb.
215 ; In re Stuyvesant Bank, 5 Ben.
566; s. c. 6 Bank Reg. 272; Miller v.
Jones, 39 Ill. 54; Johns v. Johns, 23
Ga. 31; Leach v. Tisdal, 4 Ir. Ch.
209; Bank of Monroe v. Schermerhorn, Clarke Ch. 366; Davis v. Barrett,
13 L. J. Ch., N. S., 304; Fripp v.
Chard Ry., 11 Ha. 241; Cookes v. Cookes,
2 De G., J. & S. 526 ; Perryv. Oriental
Hotels Co., L. R., 5 Ch. App. 420;
Williamson v. Wilson, I Bland 418;
Lupton v. Stephemon, 11 Ir. Eq. 484 ;.
Wilson v. Poe, 1 Hogan 322 ; Wynne v.
Lord Newborough, 15 Yes. 283; Stone
v. Wishart, 2 Madd. 64, 1 Am. ed. 374;
Garland v. Garland, 2 Yes. Jr. 137;
Benneson v. Bill, 62 Ill. 408 ; Att.-Gen.
v. Gee, 2 Yes. & Bea. 208 ; Hammer v.
Kauffnaann, 39 111. 87 ; Waters v. Carroll, 9 Yerg. 102.
LIAiimiTY op REcEIViER FoR TORTS
OF EMPLOYEES.

A receiver of a railway operating the
road, under the order ef the court, in
the same manner it may be done by the
railway company, and having the exclusive control of the road and his agemts
and employees in the business, may be
made answerable in his official capacity
to his employees and others for injuries
sustained through the negligent discharge
of his duties by himself or agents, where

the railway company, if it were operating the road, would have been liable .
Meara v. Holbrook et al., 20 Ohio
St. 137 ; Ohio 4 Miss. By. v. Anderson,
10 Ill. App. 313.
In Klein v. Jewett, 26 N. J. Eq. 475,
an action to recover damages for injuries
to passengers while passing from the
depot to the train, the court said:
"Both upon principle and authority I
think it must be held that a receiver
operating a railway under the order of
a court of equity, stands in respect to
duty and liability just where the corporation would were it operating the road,
and the question whether or not the .receiver is liable for negligence, must be
tested by the same rules that would be
applied if the corporation was the actual
party defendant."
A receiver of a railway company is
liable in his official capacity for injuries
sustained by a passenger on the railway:
Camp v. Barney, 4 Hun 373. But the
passenger cannot, without leave of the
court which appointed the receiver, sue
him to recover damages : Bartonv. Barbonr, 104 U. S. 126.
" A receiver being an officer of court,
acting under its direction and in all
things subject to its authority, it is contrary to the established doctrine of courts
of equity to permit him to be made a
party defendant to litigation unless by
consent of court. It is in all cases necessary that a person desiring to bring
suit against a receiver in his official capacity, should first obtain leave of the
court by which he was appointed, since
the court will not permit the possession
of its officers to be disturbed by suit or
otherwise, without their consent and
permission :" High on Receivers; Taylorv. Baldwin, 14 Abb. Pr. 166; Wray
v. Hazlett, 6 Phila. 155; De Groot v.
Jay, 30 Barb. 483 ; s. c. 9 Abb. Pr.
364; Miller v. Loeb, 64 Barb. 454 ;
Randfield v. Randfield, 3 De G., F. &
J. 766. See also Evelyn v. Lewis, 3
Hare 472 ; In re Persse, 8 Ir. Eq. 111;
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Parr v. Bell, 9 Id. 55; Tink v. Rundle, In Beav. 318.
"The rule is established for the protection of receivers against unnecessary
and expensive litigation."
Where the passenger has recovered
judgment against the receiver he is not
entitled to payment out of the earnings
of the road, or the proceeds of its sale
in preference to the first mortgage bondholders, unless it is so provided in the
order of the court placing the road in
the possession of the receiver : Davenport v. Receivers, 4-c., 2 Woods 519.
But in Gibbes v. Greenville 4- Columbia
Bgy. Co., 15 S. C. 518, it was held
that passengers over a railway, and
employees of the company, entitled to
damages for personal injuries received
while the road is operated by a receiver
should be paid out of the fund in court
realized from the earnings of the road
during the receivership in preference to
mortgage or other debts existing at the
time of the action brought.
The disposition of courts of chancery
in providing means to compensate passengers and employees for negligent injuries caused while the road is practically being operated by itself, usually is
liberal. It should be so, for public
safety and railway prosperity demand
safety and care in the carriage of persons
and passengers. This can best be attained by holding both the property and
the employees to a rigid accountability
for negligent injuries.
All actions against a receiver, exercising the franchises of a railway, for
injuries sustained by travellers on the
highway by reason of his negligence in
not erecting proper barriers to guard
them from driving into cuts or excavations made in the highway by his employees, must be determined by the
principles applicable to a like action
against the company when it operates its
own road : Potter v. Bunnell, 20 Ohio
St. 151.
A receiver of a railway appointed in

foreclosure proceedings is the agent of
the bondholders and the trustees, and a
judgment rendered against him by a
court of competent jurisdiction, is binding upon the interests of the bondholders:
Turner v. L, B. 4-W. By., 8 Biss. 527.
But where a railway is in the hands of
a receiver his possession is antagonistic
to that of the corporation, and the latter
is not liable for injuries resulting from
the operation of the road by the receiver: Ohio 4- Miss. By. v. Anderson,
10 111. App. 313.
Of course this would be the rule, for
the law never separates responsibility and
control. When control ceases, responsibility ends-and equitably should. So
a railway company cannot be held liable
for injuries resulting from a collision
with the rolling stock, under the management of hands employed and under
the control of the receiver: Ohio 4- Miss.
By,.Co. v. Davis, 23 Ind. 553.
The railway company will not be held
liable for injuries caused by the negligent management of a locomotive by a
person in the service of the receiver:
Turner v. Hannibal 4- St. J. By., 74
Mo. 602.
But the mere appointment of a receiver, with the powers usually given to
a receiver in chancery, does not relieve
the railway company from liability: Ohio
J- Miss. By. v. PFtch, 20Ind. 498. This
case was an action to recover from the
railway company the value of animals
killed by its machinery. The conrt said:
" We do not think the existence of the
receiver relieved the corporation from
liability to suit. The corporation still
existed, was the owner of the road, and
the law made that corporation liable
for stock killed under certain circumstances."
A receiver of a railway is personally
liable to passengers sustaining injuries
by or through his own neglect or misconduct; but for the neglect or misconduct of those employed by him in the
performance of the duties of his office,
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he is only liable in art action against
him as receivdr, an I any judgment recovered therein must be made payable
out of funds in his hands as such receiver: Camp v. Barney, supra. But a
receiver of a railway is not liable in lis
official capacity for a personal injury to
one of his employees, resulting from the
negligence of others of his employees in
the same service : Henderson v. Walker
et al., 55 Ga. 481. Where such a suit
is brought by leave of court improvidently granted, it is proper to revoke
the order granting leave and to dismiss
the action: Henderson v. Walker.
The receiver of a delinquent railway,
appointed by the governor of the state,
under the Act of 1852, 151-5, is a public agent, and, as such, not liable for
the wrongs or negligence of his employeds, but only for his own wrongful
acts or delinquencies : Hopkins v. Connel,
2 Tenn. Ch. 323.
In Kain v. Smith, 80 N. Y. 458, the
defendant S., and others, who had been
appointed receivers of the V. C. Railway
Company, leased of the C. & L. C. Ry.
Company, a New York corporation, its
road, rolling stock, &c., for a term of
years, the lessees covenanting, among
other things, to keep the demised property in good repair and to assume all
obligations of the lessor, either by statute or at common law, as common carriers and as warehousemen orotherwise.
Under this lease the lessees took possession of and operated said road. Plaintiff was in the employ of the lessees
upon the road, and while engaged in
loading a car, was injured by the fall
of a jigger, belonging to and furnished
by them for such use, but which was insufficient for the purpose ; S. was not
present at the time, and no personal
negligence on his part was claimed.
Held, that an action to recover damages
was maintainable against S. alone; that
the fact of his being a receiver did not
affect his liability, as he was not in possession of the road so leased as the offi-

cer of any court or by its authority, but
by virtue of a contract simply permitted
by the court ; that outside of the state
of Vermont the court had no jurisdiction,
and S. could do no act virtute officii in
New York ; his liability was that of an
individual, and he could not be shielded
by a description of his office, or a declaration that he was acting in an official
character.
Claims against the receiver of a railway company for property destroyed by
fire, set by sparks from defective locomotives, prior to the appointment of the receiver in foreclosure proceedings, but
subsequent to default of the railway company in the payment of the mortgage
debt, cannot be allowed: Hiles v. Case,
9 Biss. 549.
A judgment recovered against a railway company is no evidence against the
public receiver of the railway : Hopkins
v. Connel, 2 Tenn. Ch. 323.
A railway company is liable for stock
killed by its cars, where the road is not
fenced, although the road is operated at
the time by a receiver: fcKinney v.
Ohio l" Miss. By. Co., 22 Ind. 99;
Louisville, 6-c., Ry.Co. v.Cauble, 46 Id.
277. In the last case it was held that
service of process in such case upon a
conductor of a train passing through the
county where the animal was killed is
sufficient, although the conductor be employed and controlled by the receiver.
In Kinney v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 74, the
court held that the courts of the state
have jurisdiction of actions for injuries
caused by the negligence of the defendant's servants employed by him in operating a railway in the state, although he
is in possession of the road as a receiver
appointed by the United States court of
the district, and leave to bring such actions has not been obtained from that
court. See also, Barton v. Barbour, 101
U. S. 126.
The Superior Court of one county will
not order the abatement of a nuisance
erected by a railway company (such nul-
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sauce caused by the defective construction of a certain trestle and culvert on
the line of the road) where all the corporate property is in the hands of a receiver appointed by the Superior Court
of another county: Brown v. Carolina
Central, 83 N. C. 128.
In an action against a railway company for damages for injuries to plaintiff, by tie negligence of the company,
the company cannot plead either in bar
or abatement that such company was in
the hands of a receiver, and that such
action was brought without leave of the
court in which such receiver was appointed, though by bringing such suit
without leave of court, the plaintiff may
have been guilty of a contempt: Oldo
g- Miss. Ry. Co. v. Nickless, 71 Ind.
271.
A plea that at the time of the injury
to an employee, complained of, the dcfendaL: corporation was in the hands of
a receiver, appointed by the court, &c.,
is not defective because it fails to set out
the order appointing such receiver : Ohio
g- Miss. Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 10 II.
App. 313. But see contra, Ohio 4-Miss.
Bly. Co. v. Mich, 20 Ind. 499.
DISCHARGE. EFECT UPON LIABILITIES INCURRED DURING THE RECEIVERSHIP.

As regards the effect of the discharge
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him during his receivership, Mr. High,
in his work on receivers, 848, p.' 541,
says : "It is held that the discharge does
not constitute a bar to bringing any action against him on account of such matters, when the liability incurred is sufficient to create a right of action." And
he cites Miller v. Loeb, 64 Barb. 454,
and referred to in the principal case,
where it was held that the fact that a receiver has been discharged is no answer
to a motion for leave to bring an action
against him for the claim and delivery
of property, where it appears that the
claimants ,of the property had no notice
of the motion to discharge the receiver,
although he was aware of their claim;
and that the receiver has sold the property claimed after notice of the claim
and after the service upon him of a petition and notice of motion for leave to
prosecute.
The above case, together with Farmers'
Loan and Tust Co. v. Cent. Ry. Co., 2
McCrary 181, are the only authorities
we have been able to find that would
seem to indicate that the discharge of a
receiver does not operate as a discharge
of the property held by him for torts
committed during the receivership-and
these cases, as shown in the principal
case, do not support the proposition.
CH

Lxs L. BiLrwas.

Chicago.

of a receiver upon liabilities incurred by

Ohio Supreme Court Commission.
RAILROAD CO. v. GALLAGHER.
Where an employee of a railroad company, rightfully engaged in the repair of a
freight car belonging to his employer, calls upon his son, a minor under eleven years
of age, to render him necessary temporary assistance in the work, the son is not a
trespasser, and if he while so assisting, without any negligence on his part or on the
part of his father, is injured through the negligence of the agents and servants of
another railroad company, in backing a train of cars upon a side track while the car

is being repaired, the latter company is liable for damages for the injury by him so
received.
VOL. XXXII.-75
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ERROR to the District Court of Richland county.
On June 24th 1879, the Pennsylvania Company operated as
lessee the line of railroad known as the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne &
Chicago Railway, and which at Mansfield, Ohio, crosses the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The B. & 0. R. R. Co. had five different tracks, running nearly parallel with Main street in that city.
One of these tracks was known as the "transfer track," which by
means of a switch at the North end, was connected with the main
track of the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne & Chicago Railway. At the
South end of this transfer track, it was connected with the main
track of the B. & 0. R. R. Co. It was the only means of transferring cars from one of these railroads to the other.
Daniel Gallagher was in the employment of the B. & 0. R. R.
Co. as car inspector and repairer, and had a shop near this transfer track. It was a part of the duty of Daniel Gallagher to inspect
the cars coming into the yard of the B. & 0. R. R. Co., and repair
such as required repairs. His residence was a mile from the shop,
and on the 24th day of June 1879, Charles Gallagher, his son,
then a boy under eleven years of age, as had been his custom,
caried his father's dinner to the shop. A car loaded with coal,
waiting to be transferred to the P., Ft. W. & Ch. R. R., was standing on this transfer track and needed repairs. It was in some
manner broken underneath the car, where the drawbar is fastened.
Daniel Gallagher did not know how soon the car would have to be
transferred, ahd it was his duty to repair it before it left the transfer track. The north end of this track curves towards the west.
North of this broken car, and on the same transfer track, and
between it and the Pennsylvania Company's track, were standing
eight or ten freight cars, completely hiding the view of the north
end of this track, from Daniel Gallagher and his son. The father,
for the purpose of repairing the car, shovelled away the coal from
over the bolts, then requested his son to assist him, got under the
car with his son, found a strap iron bent down, put his jack under
it and was raising it, and requested his son to hold a piece of wood
under it, while the father forced it up against the iron. While the
father and son were under this car, engaged in this work, a through
freight train belonging to the Pennsylvania Company, without
signal of any kind, by bell or whistle, backed on the transfer track
six or eight cars with such force, as to strike with great force and
violence against the freight cars that were so standing upon said
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track, and against the freight car that was so being repaired, and
thereby caused the injuries to Charles Gallagher, the son, complained of.
In the court below the plaintiff claimed that the railroad was
negligent in not giving any signals, and using the transfer track in
an improper manner.
At the close of the testimony the defendant among other requests
asked the court to chaige the jury as follows: "Fourth, Even
although the defendant varied from the usual manner of using this
track in question, yet if the plaintiff was there not as an employee
of the B. & 0. R. R. Co., he cannot complain of the negligence
unless you find that the defendant's agents knew that he was there,
and wilfully injured him."
"Fifth, The mere fact that his
father took the plaintiff with him, would not invest him with
the capacity of an employee of the B. & 0. R. R. Company."
The court gave the fourth charge to thejury with the following
qualification: " Gentlemen, if the plaintiff at the time he received
the injury was wrongfully upon the track, then act upon this as
the law," to which qualification the defendant by counsel excepted.
And to the fifth request the court added the following: " This,
gentlemen, is correct. But if you find that the defendant and the
B. & 0. Company were each rightfully in the joint use and occupation of this transfer track, and the father of this-plaintiff then
in the employment of the B. & 0. Company duly authorized, was
engaged in repairing a car upon this track ; that the plaintiff brought
to him his dinner, and that while engaged in repairing said car
shortly thereafter, the .father requested plaintiff to render him
necessary temporary assistance, to enable him, the father, to perform said work of repairing said car, I will submit to you the
question as to whether the father, under the facts of this case, was
authorized to thus employ his son for the B. & 0. Company, to
assist him thus in the manner shown by the evidence. If he was
thus authorized to employ the plantiff, then the plaintiff was rightfully upon the track."
To this qualification the defendant by
counsel excepted.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Judgment was
entered accordingly. A bill of exceptions was taken embodying
all the testimony, and on error, the District Court affirmed the
judgment of the Common Pleas; to reverse which judgment of
affirmance, a petition in error is filed in this court.
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.BushTaggart, for plaintiff in error.
Jenner & Tracy, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DicuAN, J.-It was the province of the jury to inquire
whether the transfer track was used in an improper manner by the
Pennsylvania Company, at the time Charles Gallagher was injured;
and whether the company, through its agents and servants, negligently, and without giving the usual or any signal or notice to
him or to his father, moved the cars upon the transfer track, and
thus inflicted the injury received.
Upon a careful examination of all the testimony disclosed by the
record, we are not satisfied that the verdict of the jury was so
clearly against the weight of the evidence, as to require that it
should be set aside and the judgment reversed, unless the son was
assisting his father under such circumstances, or the son's conduct
at the time was such, that ordinary care and prudence to prevent
the injury could not be exacted of the Company: Landis v. Kelly,
27 Ohio St. 567.
It is not necessary to inquire, whether the son, notwithstanding
his immature years, would be responsible for a failure to use the
ordinary degree of care, as it is not claimed that there was any
negligence on his part or on the part of his father-if The father's
negligence could be imputed to him. But it is contended that the
same relations did not exist between the Pennsylvania Company
and the son which existed between that company and the father;
that the same measure of duty was not owing by that company to
the son which was owing to the father. Daniel Gallagher, it is
said, was an employee of the Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co., and was
rightfully engaged in the line of his duty, while his son was not
such an employee; that the father bad no authority from his employer to call upon his son to assist him ; and that the son rendered
the required assistance at his peril, notwithstanding the Pennsylvania Company might fail to use ordinary care and prudence.
As appears by the evidence, Daniel Gallagher was the car
inspector, and in that capacity the duty devolved upon him to
attend to the repairing of cars. His employer must be regarded
as having invested him with all the necessary powers incident to
his employmeilt. If A. employs B. to operate his factory, giving to
him the entire charge over the same, from the nature of the employ-
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ment B. is vested with power to do such acts as may be necessary
for the conduct of the business in which he is employed, in its
ordinary and usual manner; as, if machinery should break, to get
it repaired, and generally to do any acts essential to the discharge
of his duties and the prosecution of the business usually intrusted
to persons in his position: Woods Law of Master and Servant
500.
In the business of repairing the broken car, Daniel Gallagher
was authorized to bring to his aid any instrument or agency necessary to the proper performance of his work. He availed himself
of the necessary temporary assistance of his son as he used other
instrumentalities under his control. He did not delegate to another a
charge committed to himself personally, because of his acknowledged
skill and fitness, but directed his son to render assistance which
was merely mechanical, and under the supervising guidance and
control of the father's mind and will. Presumptively, Daniel Gallagher did not-exceed his powers in calling upon his son for temporary assistance; and though a contingency might have been
possible, in which the Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co., might have raised
a question as to the son's right to recover for it, in an action for
injuries received through his father's carelessness, such possible
contingency would not excuse a want of due care on the part of the
Pennsylvania Company. Charles Gallagher was not a trespasser,
nor wrongfully on the premises where he was injured. And we
cannot reach the conclusion, that he bore such a relation to the
Bait. & Ohio R. R. Co., that while rendering needed assistance
to that company, in compliance with the directions of its agent
with such implied authority, he was placed beyond the pale of
protection against the carelessness of plaintiff in error.
In another aspect-of this case, it would seem that if the Pennsylvania Company could have recovered of the Balit. & Ohio R. R.
Co., for any injury received by it at the hands of Charles Gallagher
while under his father's direction and control, the son was not such
a stranger to the service of the Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co. as to debar
him from all remedy for injuries suffered by him through the negligence of the agents and servants of the Pennsylvania Company.
That the Pennsylvania Company would have such right of action,
is the doctrine of well adjudged cases.
Simons v. Monier, 29 Barb. 419, was a case in which the defendant owned a farm, his .servant residing on it. In the course of
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farming the servant cut a quantity of brush and piled it in heaps
adjacent to the plaintiff's land. He then sent his son,, an infant,
to set fire to it, and the fire extended to the plaintiff's land, destroying a quantity of timber thereon. It was held that the act of the
son was the act of the father-the defendant's servant-he being
under his control ; and that the defendant was liable. Although
the act was done by the hand of the son, the hand was directed,
guided and controlled -by the mind and will of the father. See
Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355; Booth v. .Mister, 7 Carr. &
Payne 66.
In the view which we take of this case, the defendant was not
prejudiced by the qualifications added by the court to the fourth
and fifth requests given in charge to the jury. We are therefore
of opinion that the judgment of the District Court should be
affirmed.
Judgment accordingly.
It was urged against recovery in this
case, that the son was not an employee,
because the father had no right to call
upon him for assistance, hence he was
not rightfully on the track, and the railroad company was not responsible for
the injury. As a general proposition,
the court substantially advanced the doctrine that a railroad company guilty of
negligence is responsible for injury to a
person rightfully on the track, and in this
ease Charles Gallagher was rightfully on
the track, because the father had authority to call on him for assistance.
There are several nice distinctions
which the decisions have injected into
the principle enunciated in this case;
(1) in the limits of the liability of the
master for the torts of a sub-servant;
(2) the distinction respecting fixed and
movable property. It is a settled rule
of law that when the master places the
servant in charge of a certain department of work, or to do certain work he
is vested with the power to do any and
all acts necessary for the conduct of 'the
businesq in which he is employed, in its
ordinary and usual manner.
It is stated in Beaulieu v. FRnglam,
Year Book, 2 H. iv., fol. 18, p. 6, that

"I shall answer to my neighbor for him
who enters my house with my leave, or
with' my knowledge, or who is a guest
with me or with my servant, if he or
any of them does anything, as with a
candle or other thing by which doing
the house of my neighbor is burned.
But if a man from outside my house
against my will throws fire into the straw
of my house or elsewhere, whereby my
house is burned and also the house of my
neighbor, for this I shall not be held to
answer to them, for this cannot be called
a fault on my part, but was against my
will."
In Booth v. Mister, 7,Carr. & Payne
66, the defendant was held liable for
damages to plaintifPs cab caused by the
negligent manner in which the defendant's cart was driven. The defendant's
servant was not driving at the time, but
had entrusted the driving to a stranger who was riding with the servant,
and who was not in the service of
the defendant. The negligence of the
stranger was the act of the defendant's
servant the master having placed in the
servant power to do the injury. In Suy.
dam v. Moore 4- Losee, 8 Barb. 358, the
defendant's engineer and fireman on the
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Saratoga and Schenectady railroad, while
running the engine killed plaintiff's cow,
which had gotten on the track because
of the want of cattle-guards and fencing.
The fireman Losee was the servant of
the engineer Moore. Amongst other
things, it was urged that Losee was
not liable, not being the servant of the
company, but the court held that he was
such servant, stating "If a servant
employs another to do a business and
in doing it such person causes an injury,
the master is liable; on the principle
that both are servants of the same master, and all are responsible either jointly
or severally for an injury resulting from
negligence in conducting the train." In
,Si nons v. Mf'onier, 29 Barb. 419, the
defendant owned a tract of land adjoining the plaintiff's land, and entrusted it
to the care of and cultivation by his
servant Seth Perry, whom the defendant
directed to summer-fallow a certain part
near the plaintiff's land. In doing this
he cut a large quantity of brush growing
on it, and piled it near the plaintiff's premises. Perry then sent his son John Perry
(who was not the defendant's servant),
to set fire to the brush, which he did,
whereby the fence and the woods of the
plaintiff were burned and damaged. At
the time the fence and woods were so
dry that ordinary care forbade the burning of the brush. The defendant requested the trial court to charge the jury
that John Perry was not the servant of
the defendant, but the servant of Seth
Perry, and hence the defendant was not
responsible for his acts. This was refused,
and instead the court charged that the act
of John Perry in setting fire to the brush
was the act of Seth Perry, and that if it
was negligent to set fire to the brush,
the plaintiff should recover. The Supreme Court held the charge correct, and
stated that "the act of the son was the
act of the father. It was his immediate
personal act; for although it was done
by the hand of the son; the hand was
directed, guided, and controlled by the

mind and will of the father. It was the
father's will and volition exclusively.
It was his carelessness and not the carelessness of the son. It was precisely as
much the act of the father as though he
had used some other means or instrument
in conveying the fire and kindling the
flame. This being so, the defendant was
clearly liable if the setting of the fire
was within the scope of the employment
of Seth Perry as a hired servant, and
of this we have no doubt." Thedefendant would not have been liable had the
son been employed by the father to do
the work generally, for then he would
have been an independent actor or subcontractor. "The master's liability does
not extend to the negligent act of his
servant's agent or servant, unless the
servant of such master has directed the
particular act or is so connected with it
as to make the negligence his own, in fact
as well as in law ;" and is acting within the scope of his authority. In Altsrf
v. vo!fe, 22 N. Y. 355, whilst'the plaintiff's intestate was passing on the public
street, in front of defendant's house, he
was struck on the head with snow and
ice thrown from its roof, producing injuries which caused his death. Defendant directed his servant Fagan to remove
the snow from the roof, as it leaked.
Pagan asked one Casban to help him.
Both went on the roof and commenced
shoveling. It was not shown who threw
the snow which caused the injury. The
defendant did not direct Pagan how the
snow should be removed and gave no
authority to engage Casban. The trial
court charged the jury that Pagan had a
general power, and "if in the performance of this general direction an injury
results in consequence of negligence, the
defendant is liable ;" although the act
was done by a stranger assisting the
servant at his request. The appellate
court stated that pagan's instructions
were general; hence he was empowered
to determine how it should he performed,
and where the snow and ice should be
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deposited and the defendant was therefore liable for any injury resulting from
negligence in performing the work. "It
was immaterial whether Fagan or Cashan
threw the snow and ice. Fagan was
charged with the duty, and thus invested
with the discretion, to procure aid and
use his own judgment as to the mode,"
and hence he "put into the bands of
Fagan power to do the injury." And
DENIO, J., said, that the instructions to
Fagan gave him power to get another
person to assist. "If we keep in mind
that the defendant is responsible for the
acts of Fagan, and that Fagan took his
comrade on to the roof, and thus enabled
the latter to do the mischief, it is difficult
to discover any principle which will shield
the defendants from responsibility. It is
not necessary to consider Cashan as the
defendant's servant. He was rather the
instrumentby which Fagan,for whose condut the defendant was undeniably responsible, did the wrong."
In this case it is difficult to determine
whether the liability was placed upon the
ground that the servant acted within his
authority, or on the exploded doctrine
that the owner of fixed property is responsible for injuries resulting from its
use; a doctrine which as will be seen
originated in Bush v. Steinman.
The case of Bradley v. N. Y. C. Railroad Co., 62 N. Y. 99, was one where a
foreman, charged with the duty to keep
the track clear of snow, employed the
plaintiff to help him, and agreed to notify him of the approach of trains, but
failed to do so, whereby he was injured
by a train and the defendant was held
liable.
In some cases a distinction has been
made between a volunteer who gratuitously, and without request, assists a
servant, and where a person assists the
servant at the servantrs request, or to
expedite his own business ; the master
being liable in the latter and not in the
former case: Osborne v. Knox 4 C.
RailroadCo., 68 Me. 49 ; Degg v. Rail-

road Co., 1 H. & N. 773; Holmes v.
Railroad Co., L. R., 4 Ex. 254; 6 Id.
123; Wright v. Railroad Co., L. R., I
Q. B. 252 ; 10Id. 298 ; Potter v. Faulkner, 1 B. & S. 800. But it is difficult
to see how this distinction can as a matter of principle be made. The cause
of the injury is the negligence, and whoever produced the cause should be held
liable. Between a volunteer who assists
in furthering the master's business on his
own volition, and a person who assists
at the request of the servant, there should
be no distinction ; both are volunteers.
Recurring to the original proposition.
In Wichtrecht v. Fassnacht, 17 La. Ann.
166, the defendant, brewers, employed
men to carry beer about the city and sell
it, furnishing carts for the purpose.
These servants employed other drivers,
the defendants not objecting. While one
of the drivers so employed was driving
for the purpose of selling the beer, he
drove over the plaintiff, a small child,
and in an action to recover for the injury, it was held that the defendant was
liable, whether the injury resulted from
the act of the servant employed by himn,
or by a servant employed by the servant.
This doctrine that the master is liable
for the acts of his servant's servant; and
the rule in such cases as to who is to be
deemed the master was first adjudicated
in Bush v. Steinman, 1 Bos. & Pull. 404,
which also first announced the distinction
between fixed and movable property, but
which was subsequently repudiated. In
that case the defendant became the purchaser of a dilapidated house by the wayside. He contracted for its repair. The
contractor contracted with a carpenter to
do all the labor and furnish the material.
The carpenter contracted with a mason
to do part of the work, and also agreed
with a lime burner to furnish and deliver
the lime. The lime burner's servant
brought the lime and deposited it in the
highway in front of the defendant's
house. The plaintiff and his wife in
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passing along the highway struck against
the lime, were overturned and injured.
Tile owner of the house was held liable.
Chief Justice EY.RE at first thought that
the relation of master and servant did
not exist between the owner of the house
and the lime burner's man, but when sitting in the court in bane he concluded
otherwise, and said that the court was
satisfied that the action would lie, hut
had great difficulty in stating with accuracy the ground upon which it was to
he sustained. He said in express terms
that the relation of master and servant
as commonly exemplified in actions
brought against the master was not sufficient to sustain the decision in that case;
and that the general proposition that a
person shall be answerable for any injury
which arisesin carryinginto execution that
which he had employed another to do, was
toolarge and too loose. He relied on
Stone v. Cartwright, 6 T. R. 411 ; Littiledale v. Lonsdale, 2 H. BI. 267, and
a case stated by Justice BULLER. In
the two former the tort was done by
workmen who were really servants of the
owner, and the latter was a statement
from memory that "where a master employed a servant to do some act, and the
servant out of idleness employed another
to do it, and that person committed the
injury, the master was held liable. In
Bush v. Steinman, ROOKE, J., said
"that a man who has work going on
upon his premises for his benefit must be
civilly answerable for those whom he employs, that it shall be intended by the
court that he has control over those who
work on his premises and he shall not
he allowed to discharge himself from that
intendment of law by any actor conduct
of his own." And this was the ground
upon which the liability was placed,
namely, that the owner of fixed property
is liable for all injuries resulting from
the negligence of employees engaged in
executing work upon his premises although done by a servant of a contractor.
This was recognised in Sly v. Edyley, 6
VOL.'
XII.-76

Esp. 6 ; Mathews v.Waterworks, 3 Camp.
403. But in Overton v. Freeman, 11 C.
B. 872, the court said these cases were
unsatisfactory. The cases of Harris v.
Baker, 4 M. & S. 27, and Hallv. Smith,
2 Bing. 156, involved the same question,
bur do not place the decision on the
ground stated in Bush v. Steinman.
Rankleson v. Murray, 8 Ad. & El. 109,
was placed on the relation of master and
servant, because the master (the warehouseman) was held liable for the negligence of his servant's servant in doing
that which the master ordered done. In
Burgess v. Gray, I C. B. 578, the question involved was the relation of master
and servant, as was also in Sadler v.
Henlocc, 4 B. & B. 570, and not the
question of fixed property, as in Bush v.
Steinman. In Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B.
& C. 547, although the court was divided
the soundness of Bush v. Steinman was
questioned, and in Quarman v. Burnett,
6M. &W. 499, the same question arose,
and the opinions of TENTERDEN andLITTLE ALE in Laugher v. Pointerfollowed,
but that case does not overrule Bush v.
Steinman as to the liability of owners of
real estate. In that case the question
was whether the coach or the owner
of the horses, who furnished them with
a driver to the owner of the coach, was
liable for an injury caused by the negligence of the driver. The court held the
owner of the horses liable, the Uriver
being his servant. And whilst the court
stated to make the hirer liable "recourse
must be had to a different rule and more
extended principle, namely, that a person is liable not only for the acts of his
own servant but for any injury which
drises by the act of another person in
carrying into execution that which the
other person has contracted to do for his
benefit, a rule too large and too loose."
It also stated that the cases "in which
occupiers of land or buildings have been
held responsible for the acts of others
than their servants done upon or near or
in respect to their property have been
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properly distinguished (from the one) in
Sangher v. Pointet." Bush v. Steinman,
held the hirer responsible. Milligan v.
Wedge, 12 Ad. & El. 737, sometimes
cited as recognising Bush Y. Steinman,
rests upon Quarman v. Burnet, as to
movable property, but Lord DExAx
suggests a doubt whether the distinction
of resting the liability on fixed or movable, can be relied on. In that case a
butcher employed a licensed drover to
drive home a bullock he had bought at
market. The drover placed the bullock
in charge of a boy, by whose negligent
driving, the bullock ran into the plaintiff's slhow room, where it did considerable
damage, and the court held that the
owner of the bullock was not liable ; the
boy being the servant of the licensed
drover. This is correct, because the
drover was in an independent employment.
The case of Rapson V. Cubitt, 9 M. &
W. 710, rests upon the distinction between property, although it is adverse to
Bush v. Steinnan, on the relation of waster and servant. In that case the defendant was employed by a committee
of a club to do certain work to the club
rooms, and he contracted with a gasfitter to fix the gas fixtures. The gasfitter sent a boy to do the work, and in
negligently using a flame the gas exploded and injured the plaintiff. It was
held, that the defendant was not liable,
because the boy was not his servant, but
the servant of the gas-fitter ; the gas-fitter being an independent contractor.
The court followed Quarman v. Burnett,
and approved the distinction as to fixed
and movable property, stating, "If a
man has anything to be done on his own
premises, he must take care to injure no
one in the mode of conducting the work;
whether it be a passenger in the street or
a servant employed about his work,
seems to make no difference."
In this
it follows Sangher v. Pointer. The same
ruling and distinction was made in Allen
v. Hayward, 7 Ad. & El. 960. In

Reedie v. H. V. Railroad Co., 4 Exch.
244, the injury was done by the negligence of the servant of the contractoror the servant's servant-but the defendant was held not liable; on the ground
of contractor and contractee. The court,
alluding to the distinction between fixed
and movable property, said: "On full
consideration, we have come to the conclusion that there is no such distinction,
unless perhaps in cases where the act
complained of is such as to amount to a
nuisance, and in fact that according to the
modern decisions, Bush v. Steinman must
be taken not to be law, or at all events
that it cannot be supported on the ground
on which the judgment of the court proceeded." The case of Knight v. Fox,
5 Exch. 721, is stillstronger. In Wlhleateley v. Patrick, 2 Mees.& Welsb. 650, the
opinion was placed on the rule adverse
to Bush v..
Steinman, but did not allude
to the distinction between fixed and movable property. In Overton v. Freeman,
11 C. B. 867, lauLE;, J., said that the
case of Bush v. Steinman has been considered as having laid down the law erroneously. The case of Peachey v. Rowland, 13 C. B. 182, is similar, but doesnot refer to Bush v. Steinman. The cases
of Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Co., 2 El. & B1.
767, Leslie v. Pounds,4 Taunt. 649, and
Hobbel v. Railroad, 4 W., H. & G. 254,
are contrary to Bush v. Steinman. The
chancellor's opinion in Mayor v. Bailey,
2 Denio 433, and HARasS, t"., in Gardner
v. Heartt, 2 Barb. 165, and the case of
Triswall v. Brinson, 10 Ired. 554, sustains the distinction made in Bush v.
Steinman. Blake v. Ferris, I Seld. 48;
tevens v. Armstrong, 2 Id. 435 ; Lesher v. Navigation Co., 14 Ill. 85; Tilliard v. Newbury, 22 Yr. 458; Batty
v. Duxbury, 24 Id. 155, reject the distinction made in Bush v. Steinnan.
In Mayor v. Bailey, 2 Denio 433, the
city was held liable for the damages
caused by the breaking of the Croton
dam, on the ground that itwas the owner
of the land upon which the dam was
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erected, approving the rule in Bush v.
Steinman. And the same distinction was
approved in Althorf v. Wolfe, the court
stating that the owner of fixed property
is "bound to manage his property so
that others are not injured," no matter
whether the injury is caused by the owner's servant, or the servant of his servant, or the servant of a contractor, or
whether the act was done within the
scope of the employment. In Hilliardv.
Richardson, 3 Gray 349, in a well considered opinion, the court rejects the distinction and held, that there are not two
rules for the liability, one when the servant acts within his authority, the other
when he acts concerning fixed property;
and states that "the proposition that a
person shall be answerable for any injury
which arises in carrying into execution.
that which he has employed another to
do, ignores all limitations of legal responsibility; and this is the ground upon
which Bush v. Steinman rests." It is
true that this proposition goes too far,
because, for the master to be responsible
"for any injury which arises in carrying
into execution that which he employed
another to do," would hold the master
responsible for the acts of an independent
contractor, and the servant or servants
of the contractor; and destroy the rule
that he is only responsible for the acts of
his servant when done within the scope
of his employment, allowing the act of
the servant's servant within this sphere
to be the act of the former. Substantially the same position was held in DeForrestv. Wright, 2 Mich. 368, and Pawlet v. RailroadCo., 28 Vt. 297.
Recollecting that the case of Bush v.
Steinnan decided, that the master being
the owner of fixed property, he is liable
for any injury caused in the use of or
work on or concerning such property,
whether the act of his servant's servant
or not; and with respect to movable
things, the person who has the immediate
charge is to be deemed the master;
in Railroad v. Gallagher, the father

would be deemed the master, or where
a person hires a coach and horses;
the stable-keeper also furnishing the
driver, or owning the coach, hires the
horses, the driver being also furnished;
the hirer and not the person who furnished the driver would be deemed the
master. But the law is settled otherwise,
and now by the weight of authority, the
owner of the horses in the above illustration is the master, and the distinction,
with respect to fixed property, is repudiated, and the rule settled in these cases
as it is in the whole doctrine of master
and servant,'that the master is responsible for the acts of the servant done
within the scope of his employment;
and if the usual and ordinary method
or manner of doing the same requires
the employment of others by the servant,
such other is not the servant of the servant, but the servant of the master.
The case of Bush v. Steinman has
been recognised and approved in the following cases: Mathews v. Waterworks, 3
Camp. 403 ; Stone v. Cartwright, 6 Term
411 ;. Burgess v. Gray, I Com. B. 578 ;
Randleson v. Murray, 8 Ad. & El. 109;
Fenton v. Packet Co., 8 Id. 835 ; Stone
v. Codman, 15 Pick. 297 ; Lowell v.
Railroad Co., 23 Id. 24 ; Mayor v. Bailey, 2 Denio 434; Gardner v. ffeartt, 3
Id. 232 ; W swall v. Brinson, 10 Ired.
554; Buffalo v. Holloway, 14 Barb.
101 ; Althorfv. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355 ;
Stone v. Railroad Co., 19 N. H. 427 ;
Memphis v. Lasser, 9 Humph. 760 ;
Nashville v. Brown, 1 Heisk. I ; Silvers
v. Nerdlinger, 30 Ind. 53; Myers v.
Snyder, Bright. 489. And rejected or
denied in Gilbert v. Beach, 4 Duer 430;
Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469 ; King v.
New York, 66 1. Y. 181; R jder v.
Thomas, 13 Hun 296; Conlin v. Charleston., 15 Rich. L. 201; Benedict v. Martin, 36 Barb. 288 ; 31cCafferty v. Spuyten Duyvil R.R.Co.,61 N. Y. 178. And
overruled or repudiated in Quarman v.
Burnett; Hobbell v.R. R. Co., 4 W., R1.&
G. 254 ; Hilliard v. Richardson, 3 Gray
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349 ; Painterv. Riusburgh, 46 Penn. St.
213; Hughes v.- Boyer, 9 Watts 556;
Weyrantv. R. R.,Co., 3Duer 360; Powle
v.Hider,6E.&B. 208 ; Chilcotv. Bromley, 12 Yes. 114; Bardv. Yohn, 26 Penn.
St. 482; Pack v. NewYork, 8N. Y. 222;

Cuff v. Railroad Co., 35 N. J. L. 17 ;
Kellogg v. Payne, 21 Ia. 575; Allen v.
Willard, 57 Penn. St. 381 ; Gourdier v.
Cormack, 2 E. D. Sm. 254.
JOHN F. KELLY.
Bellaire, Ohio.

Supreme Court of

ic7higan.

FREDERICK C. LEWIS v. THE FLINT AND PERE MARQUETTE
RAILWAY CO.
In an action for damages-on account of negligence, if it appears that the accident
by which plaintiff was injured resulted from an intervening cause, and was only
connected with defendant's negligence by the fact that the latter brought plaintiff
into the position where the accident occurred, the plaintiff cannot recover.
A passenger by railway was carried past his station, and informed by the conductor that he was about two car lengths therefrom. He thereupon alighted, intendng to reach a highway which crossed the track near that point. He found, however,
that he had been carried further than two car lengths, and being familiar with the
locality started to walk back along the track intendingto cross a cattle-guard which
he knew lay between him and the highway. In the dark he slipped on the brink of
the cattle-guard-and falling into it was seriously injured. Held, that his iujury was
not proximate to defendant's wrong, and he was not entitled to recover.

Wayne.
Case. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
This was an action to recover damages for a personal injury.
The facts as they appeared on the trial were as follows :
The plaintiff resides in the township of Huron, a few miles east
ERROR to

of Belden station on the road of defendant. He was at Wayne
station on the evening of January 12th 1888, awaiting the train
which was to go south past Belden in the night. The train left
Wayne at 3.05 in the morning of the 13th, and he procured his
ticket and took passage for Belden, where the train was due at 3.80.
B
The night was dark, cold and wet. The train stopped when " elden" was called and plaintiff got off. Belden was only a flag
station for this train, and there was no one in charge of the station
house, and no light there. When plaintiff got off the train he was
told by the brakeman or conductor that they had run by the station
about two car lengths, and he replied that if that was all it was no
matter, as he had to go that way. An east and west highway
crosses the railroad about twenty-four rods south of the- station
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house, which the plaintiff would take in going to his home. If he
was two "car lengths beyond the station house, he would still be
north of the highway, and supposing that to be the case, he followed the track along south, in preference to going back to the
station house from which a passage east of the track would have led
him to the highway. The plaintiff knew the place well, and knew
that on the track he must cross an open cattle guard to readh the
highway. He had crossed this before, and sometimes found a plank
laid over it. Passing on he soon came to trees which he knew were
some distance south of the highway, and he then knew the information given him as to where he was when he alighted from the
train was erroneous. He turned about to retrace his steps, and
followed the track in the direction of the highway. This he did
carefully, because it was very dark, and he knew there was an open
cattle guard on the south side of the highway, as well as on the
north side. He was looking for this cattle guard constantly and
carefully. There were burning kilns near to the track on his right,
and the smoke from these affected his eyes, but he saw a switch
light, which he knew was near the crossing, but which at the time
was too dim to aid him. He continued to approach the cattle
guard carefully, intending if there was a timber or plank over it,
to cross upon that; and if not, then to pass down into it, and climb
out. In the dim light he saw what he believed to be the cattle
guard, which seemed td be several paces off, but at the very next
step, one foot slipped and as he attempted to save himself by springing upon the other, the other foot caught, and he was precipitated
into the cattle guard, and received an injury of a very 1erious and
permanent nature. He was Tor a time senseless, but then succeeded
in drawing himself out by his elbows, not being able to use his
lower limbs, and with great difficulty he reached a neighboring
tavern, where he was cared for.
Upon this evidence the court below took the case from the jury
and directed a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff took this writ of
error.
Blodgett & 1'atchin and C. J. Walker, for appellant.
Winer & Draperand Win. L. Webber, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COOLEY, 0. J.-On the trial a claim was made on the part of
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the defence that the plaintiff was negligent in following the railroad track back to the cattle guard and in attempting to cross it,
and evidence was given to show that he would have encountered no
impediments. But on such a night as that was, it is not clear that
the field would have afforded a safer passage than the highway; and
his failure to take it would at most only raise a question of negligence on his part which would necessarily go to the jury: Detroit,
&a., Railroad Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 118; Billings v.
Breinig, 45 Id. 72; Chicago, sc., Railroad Co. v. Miller, 46 Id.
587; Harcott v. Marquette, &c., Railroad Co., 47 Id. 7. In this
ease the court took the case from the jury, and directed a verdict
for the defendant.
This direction is understood to. have been given on the ground
that the injury which the plaintiff suffered was not proximate to the
wrong attributable to the defendant, and for that reason would not
support an action.
The wrong of the defendant consisted in carrying the plaintiff
past the station, and then giving him erroneous information as to
where he was. If the injury suffered was not a proximate consequence of this wrong, the instruction of the court was right; otherwise not. The difficulty here is in determining what is and what is
not a proximate consequence in contemplation of law.
For the plaintiff the cases are cited in which it has been held that
one whose negligence causes a" fire by the spreading of which the
property of another is destroyed, is liable for the damages though
the property for which the compensation was claimed was only
reached by-the fire after it had passed through intervening fields
or buildings: Kellogg v. C. & 1V. W. Railroad Co., 26 Wis.
223; P-ent v. Toledo, ft., Railroad Co., 59 Ill. 349; Wiley v.
West Jersey Railroad Co., 44 N. J. 248; Milwaukee, ft.,
Railroad Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469. But these cases we think
are not analogous to the one before us. The negligent fire was the
direct and sole cause of the injury in each instance, and there was
no intervening cause whatever. The cases are in harmony with
Hoyt v. Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181. The case of Pennsylvania Co. v.
Roagland, 78 Ind. 203, seems at first view to be more in point.
The action in that case was brought by a woman, who in consequence
of misinformation on the part of the person in charge of a railroad
train, left the car in the night time at the wrong stopping place, and
wandered about for an hour or more before she could find shelter,
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taking cold from exposure. But here, as in the other cases cited,
there was no cause intervening between the wrong complained of and
the resulting injury, and the question of proximate cause does not
appear to have been raised in the case. Smith v. Steam -Packet
Co., 86 N. Y. 408, is also relied upon, but it is unlike this in the
important particular, that the intervening cause which, after the
first wrong on the part of the defendant, operated to bring injury
to the plaintiff, was a neglect of proper care, which the court held
was due from the defendant to the plaintiff under the circumstances,
so that all the injury received was a proximate result of the defendant's neglect of duty.
The case of Brown et ux. v. Chicago,ft., Railroad Co., 54 Wit.
842, more nearly resembles the present case than any other to which
our attention has been called by counsel for the plaintiff. The
facts, as stated in the prevailing opinion, are the following: The
plaintiffs, with their child, seven years old, were being carried on
defendant's cars with Manston for their destination, and when they
arrived at a station three miles east of Manston, they left the train
under the direction of the brakeman, who told them they were at
Manston. It was in the night; it was cloudy and wet; there was
a freight train standing on a side track where they were put off the
train; there was no platform, and no lights visible except on the
freight train. Plaintiffs soon ascertained they were not at Manston,
but did not know where they were. They did not see the station
house, though there was one, hidden from their view by the freight
train. They supposed they were at a place two miles, east where
the train sometimes stopped, but where there was no station house.
They started west on the track toward Manston, expecting to find
E house where they might stop, but did not find one until they came
to a bridge within a mile of MAanston, and then they thought it
easier to go on to that place than to seek shelter at the house, which
was a considerable distance from the track. Mrs. Brown was pregnant at the time, and when she arrived at Manston was quite exhausted. " She had during the night severe pains, which continued
from time to time, and were followed by flowing, and at length by
a miscarriage, inflammation and serious illness. The plaintiffs
claimed that the miscarriage and subsequent sickness were all caused
by the walk Mrs. Brown was compelled to take to get from the
place where they were left by the train, to Manston; and the question in the case was whether the defendant was liable for the injury
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to Mrs. Brown, admitting it to have been caused by her walk. The
majority of the, court, finding that " there was no intervening independent cause of the injury, other than the act of the defendant,"
and that "all the acts done by the plaintiffs, and from which the
injury flowed, were rightful on their part, and compelled by the
act of the defendant," held that "th e injury to Mrs. Brown was
the direct result of the defendant's negligence, and that such negligence was the proximate and not the remote cause of the injury;"
quoting Lord ELLENBOROUGH in Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark. 402,
that "if I place a man in such a situation that he must adopt a
perilous alternative, I am responsible for the consequences."
The case of Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Barker, 4 Col. 844;
s. c. 84 Am. Rep. 89, is opposed to the case in Wisconsin, as are
also Hobbs v. London & S. T. Bailroad Co., L. R., 10 Q. B. 111,
and Praneisv. St. Louis Transfer Co., 5 Mo. App. T. But it'is
not necessary to express any opinion upon th-e conflict which these
cases disclose, because in the case before us there was an independent cause intervening between the fault of the defendant and the
injury the plaintiff sustained, and from which the injury resulted
as a direct and immediate consdquence.
To show what is understood by intervening cause, it may be useful to refer to a few cases. Livie v. Janson, 12 East 648, was a
case of insurance on a ship warranted free of American condemnation. In sailing out of New York she was damaged by perils of
the sea, stranded and wrecked on Governor's Island, and then
seized and condemned. It was the peril of the sea that caused the
vessel to be seized and condemned, but as the condemnation -was
the proximate cause of the loss, the insurers were held not liable.
A similar case is Delanov. Insurance Co., 10 Mass. 354, where a
like result wag reached.
In Tisdale v. Norton, 8 Met. 888, the facts were that a highway
was defective, and the plaintiff, who was using it, went out of it
into the adjoining field where he sustained an injury. He brought
suit against the town, whose duty it was to keep the highway in
repair. But the court held that only as a remote cause could the
injury of the plaintiff be said to be due to the defect in the highway. The proximate not the remote cause, is that which is referred
to in the statute which gives an action against the town, and
the proximate cause in this case was outside the highway, not
within it.
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In Anthony v. ,Slaid,11 Met. 290, the plaintiff, who was contractor with a town to support for a specified time and for a fixed
sum all the town paupers in sickness and in health, brought suit
against one who, it was alleged, had assaulted and beaten one of
the paupers, as a consequence of which the plaintiff was put to
increased expense for care and support; but the action was held not
maintainable.
In Silver v. Frazier, 3 Allen 382, it was decided that a principal
whose agent has disobeyed his instructions, induced to do so by the
false representations of a third party, cannot maintain an action
against such third party for the damage sustained. Said BIGELow,
C.J. : "The alleged loss or injury suffered by the plaintiff is not
the direct and immediate result of the defendant's wrongful act.
Stripped of its technical language the declaration charges only that
the agent employed by the plaintiff to do a certain piece of work
disobeyed the orders of his principal, and was induced to do so by
the false statements of the defendant. In other words the plaintiff alleges that his agent violated his duty and thereby did him
an injury, and seeks to recover damages therefor by an action
against a third person, on the ground that he induced the agent
by false statements to go contrary to the orders of his principal.
Such an action is, we believe, without precedent. *The immediate
cause of injury and loss to the plaintiff is the breach, of duty of his
agent. This is the proximate cause of damage. The motives or
inducement which operated to cause the agent to do an unauthorized act are too remote to afford a good cause of action to the
plaintiff."
In Dubuque Wood &-Coal A8sociation v. Dubuque, 30 Ia. 176,
the facts were that the plaintiff had a quantity of.wood deposited
at one end of a bridge which was to be taken over the bridge into
the city of Dubuque. The bridge was out of repair, and while
awaiting repair by the city whose duty it was, the wood was carried away by a flood. The plaintiff sued the city for the value of
his wood, but it was held be could not recover. BECK, J., in
deciding the case illustrates the principle as follows : "An owner
of lumber deposited upon the levee of the city of Dubuque exposed to the floods of the river starts with his team to remove
it. A bridge built by the city which he attempts to cross, from
defects therein falls, and his horses are killed. By the breaking
of the bridge and the loss of his team he is delayed in moving his
VOL. XXX
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property. On account of this delay his lumber is carried away by
the flood and lost. The proximate consequence of the negligence
of the city is the loss of his horses. The secondary consequence,
resulting from the first consequence, is the delay in removing the
lumber, which finally caused its loss. Damage on account of the
first is recoverable, but for the second is denied."
Similar to this are -Danielsv. Ballantine, 23 Ohio St. 532; s. c.
13 Am. Rep. 264; and MeClary v. Sioux City, ft., Railroad Co.,
3 Neb. 44; s. c. 19 Am. Rep. 631. In each of these cases the
negligence of the defendant left the property of the plaintiff where
by an act of God-in one case a flood and in the other a tornadoit was lost or injured, and in each the act of God and not the negligence was held to be the proximate cause of injury.
In Scheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U. S. 249, it appeared that by
a collision of railroad trains a passenger was injured, and becoming thereby disordered in mind and body, he, some eight months
thereafter, committed suicide. Action was brought against the
railroad company as the negligent cause of his death. MILLER, J.,
speaking for the court, and referring to Xnsurance Cb. v. Tweed,
7 Wall. 44, and M ilwaukee, ,c., Railroad Co. v. JKellogg, 94 U.
S.469, said: "The proximate cause of the death of Scheffer was
his own act of self-destruction. It was within the rule in both cases
a new cause, and a sufficient cause of death. The argument is not
sound which seeks to trace this immediate cause of death through
the previous stages of mental aberration, physical suffering and
eight months disease and medical treatment, to the original accident on the railroad."
In Bosch v. Burlington, &c., Railroad Co., 44 Ia. 402, the
plaintiff's house took fire and the fire department, because, as was
alleged, of the wrongful occupation and expansion of the river
bank, were unable to get to the river to obtain water for putting
out the fire. iPlaintiff sued the defendant for the loss of his property, but the court said the acts of defendant complained of" have
no connection with the fire, nor with the hose or other apparatus
of the fire companies. They are independent acts, and their influence in the destruction of plaintiffs property is too remote to be
made the basis of recovery."
In this last case Metallic Compression Co. v. Railroad (o., 109
Mass. 277; s. c. 12 Am. Rep. 689, was referred to and distinguished. The facts there were that the plaintiffs' building was 'on
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fire, and water was being thrown upon it through hose, when
an engine of defendant was recklessly run upon the hose and severed it, thereby.defeating the efforts to extinguish the fire, which
otherwise were likely to succeed. In that case the relation of the
plaintiff's injury to the defendant's act was direct and immediate.
So it was also in Billman v. Indianapolis, '., Railroad Co., 76
Ind. 166; Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136; and Bicker
v. Freeman, 50 N. H. 420, all of which are ruled by the squib
case (Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. Bl. 892) and so p6rhaps are Fairbanks v. Kerr, 70 Penn. St. 90; s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 664, and Lake
v. Milliken, 62 Me. 240; s. c. 16 Am. Rep. 456.
In flenry v. St. Louis, &c., Railroad Go., 76 Mo. 288; s. c.
43 Am. Rep. 762, it appeared that the plaintiff was wrongfully commanded to get off a caboose of the defendant, where he bad a right
to be. He obeyed the command, and while upon the ground stepped
upon a track, where he was run upon and injured by a train.
HOUGH, J., speaking for the court, said: "It is perhaps probable
that if the plaintiff had not been ordered out of the caboose, he
would not have been injured, but this hypothesis does not establish
the legal relation of cause and effect between the expulsion and the
injury. If the plaintiff had not left home he certainly would not
have been injured as he was, but his leaving home could not therefore be declared to be the cause of his injury. As the plaintiff's
injury was neither the ordinary, natural nor probable consequence
of his expulsion from the caboose, such expulsion, however it might
excite our indignation, in the absence of any regulation of defendant to justify it, cannot be considered in this action, and the legal
aspect of the. case is precisely the same that it would have been if
no such expulsion had taken place. It is to be regarded as if the
plaintiff had gone to the caboose and could not get in because it
was locked, or, being unable to get in, chose to remain outside."
Further reference to authorities is needless. The application of
the rule that the proximate and not the remote cause is to be regarded, is obscure and difficult in many cases, but not in this. By
the wrong of the defendant the plaintiff was carried past the station
where he had a right to be left, and beyond where he had a right,
from the information received from defendant's servants, to suppose
he was when he left the car. For any injury or inconvenience naturally resulting from the wrong, and traceable to it as the proximate
cause, the defendant may be held responsible. But before any injury
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had been sustained the plaintiff discovered where he was, and started
back for the road which he had intended to take. Whatever danger there was to be encountered in the way was to be found in the
cattle-guard, and this he understood and calculated upon. Evidently it did not appear to him of a formidable nature, for on the
supposition that he was north of the highway when he left the
train, he had voluntarily staretd south with the expectation of crossing the cattle-guard on that side, over which he might or might
not find a plank laid, when by stepping back a few rods where he
supposed the station-house to be, he might pass from thence out to
the highway by the passage way for persons and vehicles leading
from the station house to it, and thereby avoid the cattle-guard
altogether. It is very clear that he did not anticipate danger.
Neither, probably, would any other person have anticipated it.
The crossing was a simple matter ; it was only to ascertain first
whether a plank or timber was laid across, and if so, to cross
upon it, and if not, to step down into the excavation, and out on
the other side. Where was he to look for danger? The nightwas
dark, it is true; but even by the sense of feeling, when he knew
he was within a few feet of the cattle-guard, one would expect him
to be able to determine its exact location. But then something
happened which it is evident that the plaintiff, with full knowledge
of all the facts, did not at all expect and had not feared. Misled
apparently by visual deception, he moved forward under a supposition that the cattle-guard upon the brink of which he already
stood was some paces off, and this deception with the slipping of his
foot concurred to produce the injury.
What was this but pure accident ? It was an event which happened unexpectedly and without fault. The defendant or its agents
had not produced the deception or caused the foot to slip, and
such wrong as the defendant had been guilty of was in no manner
connected with or related to the injury except as it was the occasion
for bringing the plaintiff where the accident occurred. It was after
the plaintiff had been brought there that the cause of injury unexpectedly arose. If lightning had chanced to strike the plaintiff at
that place, the fault of the defendant and its relation to the injury
would have been the same as now, and the injury could have been
charged to the defendant with precisely the same reason as now.
If the accidental discharge of a gun in the hands of some third
person had wounded the plaintiff as he approached the cattle-guard,
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the connection of defendant's wrong with the injury would have
been precisely the same which appears here. But the proximate
cause of injury in one case would have been the act of God; in the
other, inevitable accident; but not more plainly accident than was
the proximate cause here. Back of that cause in this case were
many others, all conducing to bring the plaintiff to the place of the
danger and the injury; the act of the defendant was the last of a
long sequence; but as between the causes which precede the proximate cause, the law cannot select one rather than any other as that
to which the final consequence shall be attributed, and it stops at
the proximate cause because to go back of it would be to enter
upon an investigation which would be both endless and useless.
The injury being the result 'of pure accident, the party upon
whom it has chanced to fall is necessarily left to bear it. No compensation can be given by law in such cases : Weaver v. Ward, Hob.
134; Gibbons v. Pepper, 1 Ld. Raym. 38; Losee v. Buchanan;
51 N. Y. 476; S. C. 10 Am. Rep. 623; Vincent v. Stinehour, 7
Vt. 62; s. c. 29 Am. Dec. 145; Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75;
Brown v. Collins, 53 N. H. 442; s. c. 16 Am. Rep. 372; Bizzell
v. Booker, 16 Ark. 308; Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. 339; s. c.
20 Am. Rep. 394; Paxton v. Boyer, 67 Ill. 132; s. c. 16 Am.
Rep. 615 ; American Express ( o. v. Smith, 33 Ohio St 511 ; s. c.
31 Am. Rep. 561; Plummer v. State, 4 Tex. Ap. 310; s. c. 30
Am. Rep. 165; Parrotv. Well , 15 Wall. 524; Holmes v. .Mather,
L. R., 10 Ex. 261. A case like this appeals strongly to.the sympathies, but sympathy cannot rule the decision. Upon the undisputed facts of the case the plaintiff has no right of action for the
injury which has befallen him, and the circuit court was correct in
so holding. The question what judgment shall be rendered in the
case is for the present reserved.
The other justices concurred.

